Facts
Whetstone was a shareholder in Hossfeld, which consisted of 13 shareholders. Whetstone owned 36% and the president and his wife, individually and as joint tenants, own 50.93%. Hossfeld moved to amend its bylaws by a 2-1 vote; Whetstone was the dissent. Hossfeld refused to buy Whetstone’s shares.
Procedural History
Whetstone filed suit and the trial court granted summary judgment for Whetstone. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that elimination of veto powers is not among the events which entitle dissenting shareholders to receive the fair value of their shares?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the use of veto power arrangements have long been recognized as a means of providing a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation protection against prejudicial conduct by the majority shareholders. Amendments which eliminate these veto powers unquestionably limits the rights of the minority shareholder. Before the amendments, Whetstone had the deciding vote; after the amendments, Whetstone’s vote was little more than a formality.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Thursday, May 28, 2009
Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 788 A.2d 268 (N.J. 2002)
Facts
WPU awarded Edgewater the contract for the reconstruction of its athletic fields. Edgewater subbed the turf grass job to GSI. The turf was installed and did not drain properly, leaving the filed continuously soggy.
Issue(s)
Were the corporate officers of GSI personally liable under the participation theory?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that under the participation theory, a corporate officer can be held personally liable for a tort committed by the corporation when he or she is sufficiently involved in the commission of the tort. If the breach is governed by contract, instead of tort, the participation theory is inapplicable. The scope of the obligations were defined by the contract that the responsibilities were imposed on GSI, not its corporate officers. Because the allegations sound in tort, plaintiff cannot convert contract claims into negligence claims for personal liability.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court.
WPU awarded Edgewater the contract for the reconstruction of its athletic fields. Edgewater subbed the turf grass job to GSI. The turf was installed and did not drain properly, leaving the filed continuously soggy.
Issue(s)
Were the corporate officers of GSI personally liable under the participation theory?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that under the participation theory, a corporate officer can be held personally liable for a tort committed by the corporation when he or she is sufficiently involved in the commission of the tort. If the breach is governed by contract, instead of tort, the participation theory is inapplicable. The scope of the obligations were defined by the contract that the responsibilities were imposed on GSI, not its corporate officers. Because the allegations sound in tort, plaintiff cannot convert contract claims into negligence claims for personal liability.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court.
Reiss v. Financial Performance Center, 764 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 2001)
Issue(s)
Did the Appellate Court err in finding Reiss and Rebot were bound by the reverse stock split?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that even where a contingency has been omitted, we will not necessarily imply a term since courts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract. Financial should not be given a remedy to save it from the consequences of its own agreements.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court.
Did the Appellate Court err in finding Reiss and Rebot were bound by the reverse stock split?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that even where a contingency has been omitted, we will not necessarily imply a term since courts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby make a new contract. Financial should not be given a remedy to save it from the consequences of its own agreements.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court.
Reiss v. Financial Performance Corporation, 715 N.Y.S.2d 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
Facts
Financial issued warrants to Rebot and Reiss to purchase shares of stock for 10 cents per share, extending for five years. Three years later, the Board of Directors approved a one-for-five stock split. Rebot and Reiss sought to exercise their warrants within the five years, arguing they were not subject to the stock split.
Issue(s)
When a warrant is silent on reverse stock splits, must the warrant be deemed to reflect a proportional change to reflect the split?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in the absence of evidence the parties contemplated otherwise, the warrant holder is limited to the proportional number of shares. Just as plaintiffs should not suffer from the possibility of dilution of their warrants, Financial should not suffer from the consolidation of its shares resulting from a reverse stock split.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court found in favor of Financial.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
The dissent felt the Court should not have changed the terms of the agreement when fraud, duress, mistake, etc. could not be shown.
Financial issued warrants to Rebot and Reiss to purchase shares of stock for 10 cents per share, extending for five years. Three years later, the Board of Directors approved a one-for-five stock split. Rebot and Reiss sought to exercise their warrants within the five years, arguing they were not subject to the stock split.
Issue(s)
When a warrant is silent on reverse stock splits, must the warrant be deemed to reflect a proportional change to reflect the split?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in the absence of evidence the parties contemplated otherwise, the warrant holder is limited to the proportional number of shares. Just as plaintiffs should not suffer from the possibility of dilution of their warrants, Financial should not suffer from the consolidation of its shares resulting from a reverse stock split.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court found in favor of Financial.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
The dissent felt the Court should not have changed the terms of the agreement when fraud, duress, mistake, etc. could not be shown.
Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 426 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. 1993)
Facts
Parsons was a shareholder of Jefferson-Pilot and sent a letter requesting that she be allowed to inspect and copy records so she may communicate with other shareholders. Jefferson-Pilot refused to provide a list of beneficial owners of its stock, stating it did not have that information. Parsons also sought accounting records, which were denied.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals found that MBCA § 16.02(b) abrogated a shareholder’s common law right to inspect the accounting records of a public corporation.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the common law right to inspect accounting records abrogated by MBCA § 16.02(b)? Did Court of Appeals err in failing to compel production of the beneficial owners list?
Holding(s)
Yes; No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that MBCA § 16.02(e)(2) preserves a shareholder’s common law right in inspection, including accounting records. As to the beneficial owners list, shareholders are entitled to the information concerning identity of the shareholders which is possessed by the corporation. A shareholder is not granted the right to require a corporation to obtain beneficial owners lists or the information necessary to compile the lists.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Parsons was a shareholder of Jefferson-Pilot and sent a letter requesting that she be allowed to inspect and copy records so she may communicate with other shareholders. Jefferson-Pilot refused to provide a list of beneficial owners of its stock, stating it did not have that information. Parsons also sought accounting records, which were denied.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals found that MBCA § 16.02(b) abrogated a shareholder’s common law right to inspect the accounting records of a public corporation.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the common law right to inspect accounting records abrogated by MBCA § 16.02(b)? Did Court of Appeals err in failing to compel production of the beneficial owners list?
Holding(s)
Yes; No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that MBCA § 16.02(e)(2) preserves a shareholder’s common law right in inspection, including accounting records. As to the beneficial owners list, shareholders are entitled to the information concerning identity of the shareholders which is possessed by the corporation. A shareholder is not granted the right to require a corporation to obtain beneficial owners lists or the information necessary to compile the lists.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Moneywatch Companies v. Wilbers, 665 N.E.2d 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
Facts
Wilbers signed a lease with Moneywatch for commercial property space. During negotiations, Wilbers stated his intent to create a corporation and was told he would still need to remain personally liable. After Wilbers formed the corporation, he notified Moneywatch and the name on the lease was changed to the corporate name. The rent payments eventually stopped and the premises were vacated.
Procedural History
Moneywatch brought a breach of contract against Wilbers personally. After a bench trial, judge entered judgment in favor of Moneywatch for $13,922.67.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in holding Wilbers personally liable instead of the corporation?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Wilbers argued a novation occurred and he is not personally liable. A novation is where a previous valid obligation is extinguished by a new valid contract, accomplished through substitution of parties, with the consent of both parties, and based on valid consideration. The Court found a novation did not occur because there was no clear and definite intent from Moneywatch to create a new contract through novation. Also, there was insufficient consideration. In the absence of the proper steps, Wilbers is personally liable.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Wilbers signed a lease with Moneywatch for commercial property space. During negotiations, Wilbers stated his intent to create a corporation and was told he would still need to remain personally liable. After Wilbers formed the corporation, he notified Moneywatch and the name on the lease was changed to the corporate name. The rent payments eventually stopped and the premises were vacated.
Procedural History
Moneywatch brought a breach of contract against Wilbers personally. After a bench trial, judge entered judgment in favor of Moneywatch for $13,922.67.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in holding Wilbers personally liable instead of the corporation?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Wilbers argued a novation occurred and he is not personally liable. A novation is where a previous valid obligation is extinguished by a new valid contract, accomplished through substitution of parties, with the consent of both parties, and based on valid consideration. The Court found a novation did not occur because there was no clear and definite intent from Moneywatch to create a new contract through novation. Also, there was insufficient consideration. In the absence of the proper steps, Wilbers is personally liable.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)
Facts
Louisa Gerry leased to Salmon for a 20 year period. Salmon was partners with Meinhard. When the lease was near its end, Elbridge Gerry had become the owner and approached Salmon about a new lease. Salmon entered into the lease but did not tell Meinhard about the new lease.
Issue(s)
Did Salmon have a fiduciary duty to inform Meinhard of an opportunity which would occur after the termination of the lease?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Salmon held the lease as a fiduciary for himself and another, sharers in a common venture. Had this fact been proclaimed, Gerry would have laid before the partners, and not merely before one of them, his plan of reconstruction. We have no thought to hold that Salmon was guilty of a conscious purpose to defraud.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court found in favor of Meinhard.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Andrews dissented stating that the venture inaugurated had in view a limited object and was to end at a limited. The design was to exploit a particular lease.
Louisa Gerry leased to Salmon for a 20 year period. Salmon was partners with Meinhard. When the lease was near its end, Elbridge Gerry had become the owner and approached Salmon about a new lease. Salmon entered into the lease but did not tell Meinhard about the new lease.
Issue(s)
Did Salmon have a fiduciary duty to inform Meinhard of an opportunity which would occur after the termination of the lease?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Salmon held the lease as a fiduciary for himself and another, sharers in a common venture. Had this fact been proclaimed, Gerry would have laid before the partners, and not merely before one of them, his plan of reconstruction. We have no thought to hold that Salmon was guilty of a conscious purpose to defraud.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court found in favor of Meinhard.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Andrews dissented stating that the venture inaugurated had in view a limited object and was to end at a limited. The design was to exploit a particular lease.
McIlvaine v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 581 So. 2d 454 (Ala. 1991)
Facts
AmSouth was the trustee and McIlvaine was the son of a beneficiary from the trust. Beneficiary died on the record date of a dividend to the trust.
Procedural History
Trial court instructed AmSouth to pay the April 11 dividend to the beneficiary’s estate because beneficiary died before the close of business.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in relying on the fact that beneficiary died before the close of business on April 11?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that where the dividend is payable on a date prior to death, the dividend is included in the estate, but if the dividend is payable after death, the dividend is not included in the estate. Gene tried to argue that other courts have considered fractions of a day but the court found a fraction of the day is considered a full day. The trial court was correct in finding Tommy was the beneficial shareholder on the record date and that as a result, his estate is entitled to the dividend.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
AmSouth was the trustee and McIlvaine was the son of a beneficiary from the trust. Beneficiary died on the record date of a dividend to the trust.
Procedural History
Trial court instructed AmSouth to pay the April 11 dividend to the beneficiary’s estate because beneficiary died before the close of business.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in relying on the fact that beneficiary died before the close of business on April 11?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that where the dividend is payable on a date prior to death, the dividend is included in the estate, but if the dividend is payable after death, the dividend is not included in the estate. Gene tried to argue that other courts have considered fractions of a day but the court found a fraction of the day is considered a full day. The trial court was correct in finding Tommy was the beneficial shareholder on the record date and that as a result, his estate is entitled to the dividend.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697 (Mont. 2004)
Facts
Joan and Clark were the children of Charles and Helen. Charles purchased the Brevig Ranch and Clark and his father owned the ranch in equal shares. Charles died and each received half of the ranch, Thus Clark had 75% and Joan had 25%. Joan later purchased the additional 25% share. The relationship went sour and Joan brought suit against Clark.
Procedural History
The District Court found that Joan was a 50% holder and should be credited for excess contributions she made. The Court also concluded the partnership should be dissolved and its business wound up.
Issue(s)
After ordering dissolution, did the District Court err by failing to order liquidation of the assets, and instead granting Clark the right to purchase Joan’s partnership?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the UPA requires liquidation of partnership assets and distribution of the net surplus in cash to the partners upon dissoulution. UPA provides two separate tracks, one applying to dissociation and the other to dissolution. The District Court dissolved the partnership but reasoned that liquidation had a variety of meanings. The common meaning, however, is to reduce assets to cash, pay creditors, and distribute to partners.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Joan and Clark were the children of Charles and Helen. Charles purchased the Brevig Ranch and Clark and his father owned the ranch in equal shares. Charles died and each received half of the ranch, Thus Clark had 75% and Joan had 25%. Joan later purchased the additional 25% share. The relationship went sour and Joan brought suit against Clark.
Procedural History
The District Court found that Joan was a 50% holder and should be credited for excess contributions she made. The Court also concluded the partnership should be dissolved and its business wound up.
Issue(s)
After ordering dissolution, did the District Court err by failing to order liquidation of the assets, and instead granting Clark the right to purchase Joan’s partnership?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the UPA requires liquidation of partnership assets and distribution of the net surplus in cash to the partners upon dissoulution. UPA provides two separate tracks, one applying to dissociation and the other to dissolution. The District Court dissolved the partnership but reasoned that liquidation had a variety of meanings. The common meaning, however, is to reduce assets to cash, pay creditors, and distribute to partners.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Man o’ War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin, 932 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1996)
Facts
Martin was hired as a manager of Sizzler and was permitted to purchase 25% of the stock in corporation. If he was terminated during his 5 year employment contract, however, Martin was required to return the stock in exchange for the purchase price. Martin was terminated after 3 years and demand was made for the stock.
Procedural History
Martin contended the termination was without cause but the trial court found otherwise. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Was the contract provision compelling the transfer of property without regard to its value enforceable?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the only way the stock return provision of the contract can be upheld is if Martin is paid book value or fair market value for the stock. Upon the transfer of stock to Martin, he held it independently of his status as an employee, making the stock his property. Public policy against forfeiture protects property from being taken without appropriate compensation.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Martin was hired as a manager of Sizzler and was permitted to purchase 25% of the stock in corporation. If he was terminated during his 5 year employment contract, however, Martin was required to return the stock in exchange for the purchase price. Martin was terminated after 3 years and demand was made for the stock.
Procedural History
Martin contended the termination was without cause but the trial court found otherwise. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Was the contract provision compelling the transfer of property without regard to its value enforceable?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the only way the stock return provision of the contract can be upheld is if Martin is paid book value or fair market value for the stock. Upon the transfer of stock to Martin, he held it independently of his status as an employee, making the stock his property. Public policy against forfeiture protects property from being taken without appropriate compensation.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Lynam v. Gallagher, 526 A.2d 878 (Del. 1987)
Facts
The parties married in 1959 separated in 1983 and divorced in 1984. Husband had received shares of stock prior to the marriage. While they were still married, WTC issued two, 100%, stock dividends, and one stock dividend after the divorce.
Procedural History
Husband and wife disagreed over whether stock held prior to marriage and dividends occurring during marriage were marital property. The Family Court adopted wife’s argument and found the dividends were marital property but the shares held prior to marriage were husband’s.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding the dividends occurring during the marriage were marital property?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the three 100% dividends received on the shares held prior to marriage were an increase in property and excluded from marital property. The husband did not receive any property of value and had WTC not declared any dividends, the price of the shares would have been approximately eight times their value. Stock certificates are mere evidence of property.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The parties married in 1959 separated in 1983 and divorced in 1984. Husband had received shares of stock prior to the marriage. While they were still married, WTC issued two, 100%, stock dividends, and one stock dividend after the divorce.
Procedural History
Husband and wife disagreed over whether stock held prior to marriage and dividends occurring during marriage were marital property. The Family Court adopted wife’s argument and found the dividends were marital property but the shares held prior to marriage were husband’s.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding the dividends occurring during the marriage were marital property?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the three 100% dividends received on the shares held prior to marriage were an increase in property and excluded from marital property. The husband did not receive any property of value and had WTC not declared any dividends, the price of the shares would have been approximately eight times their value. Stock certificates are mere evidence of property.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 2001)
Facts
Atlas was started and run as a family business with Alex owning 57.68%, John, the brother, owning 37.7% and Louise, the sister, owning 3%. Tensions began between Alex and John and John allegedly said he was leaving job as president. When John returned to work, he was told he was no longer president and was offered a buy out of $1 million and forgiveness of $800,000 owed. John refused.
Procedural History
John sued alleging claims of fraud under the judicial dissolution statute. The referee found Alex had engaged in fraud and found Atlas had engaged in conduct which was fraudulent, oppressive, and unfairly prejudicial toward John and Louise. The court of appeals affirmed, defining the terms oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding (1) against Atlas for its conduct and (2) defining the terms of oppressive and unfairly prejudicial?
Holding(s)
No; Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the legislative intent of the terminology was that the terms were elastic and their application varied with the circumstances. The Court of Appeals attempt to create a rigid test was contrary to the legislative intent. As to the treatment of John and Louise, the Court found that the case presented a classic example of a freeze out. The Court found the factors relied on by the referee in determining a freeze out occurred was correct.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals.
Atlas was started and run as a family business with Alex owning 57.68%, John, the brother, owning 37.7% and Louise, the sister, owning 3%. Tensions began between Alex and John and John allegedly said he was leaving job as president. When John returned to work, he was told he was no longer president and was offered a buy out of $1 million and forgiveness of $800,000 owed. John refused.
Procedural History
John sued alleging claims of fraud under the judicial dissolution statute. The referee found Alex had engaged in fraud and found Atlas had engaged in conduct which was fraudulent, oppressive, and unfairly prejudicial toward John and Louise. The court of appeals affirmed, defining the terms oppressive and unfairly prejudicial.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding (1) against Atlas for its conduct and (2) defining the terms of oppressive and unfairly prejudicial?
Holding(s)
No; Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the legislative intent of the terminology was that the terms were elastic and their application varied with the circumstances. The Court of Appeals attempt to create a rigid test was contrary to the legislative intent. As to the treatment of John and Louise, the Court found that the case presented a classic example of a freeze out. The Court found the factors relied on by the referee in determining a freeze out occurred was correct.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals.
Kansallis Finance Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731 (Mass. 1996)
Facts
Jones was a partner in a law firm who drafted an opinion letter. Jones did not sign the letter (he had a third party sign) but it was found that Jones adopted or ratified the letter. Jones was later convicted on criminal charges but the Plaintiff was unable to collect the $800,000 judgment. Plaintiff then sued the other partners in the firm.
Procedural History
Both the judge and jury found the defendants were not liable for Jones’ conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed and certified a question to the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
To find that an act is within the scope of the partnership, must it be shown that that the act was taken at least in part with the intent to serve or benefit the partnership?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in the context of a partnership, the persons usually stand on equal footing but with the law on vicarious liability, the actor was often in a subordinate position. The jury found that Jones acted without actual or apparent authority. There are two routes where vicarious liability may be found: (1) if the partner has apparent authority or (2) if there is no apparent authority, there may be vicarious liability on the alternate ground requiring intent to benefit the partnership. There is no evidence that Jones was acting to benefit the partnership.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court found the jury instructions to be correct.
Jones was a partner in a law firm who drafted an opinion letter. Jones did not sign the letter (he had a third party sign) but it was found that Jones adopted or ratified the letter. Jones was later convicted on criminal charges but the Plaintiff was unable to collect the $800,000 judgment. Plaintiff then sued the other partners in the firm.
Procedural History
Both the judge and jury found the defendants were not liable for Jones’ conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed and certified a question to the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
To find that an act is within the scope of the partnership, must it be shown that that the act was taken at least in part with the intent to serve or benefit the partnership?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in the context of a partnership, the persons usually stand on equal footing but with the law on vicarious liability, the actor was often in a subordinate position. The jury found that Jones acted without actual or apparent authority. There are two routes where vicarious liability may be found: (1) if the partner has apparent authority or (2) if there is no apparent authority, there may be vicarious liability on the alternate ground requiring intent to benefit the partnership. There is no evidence that Jones was acting to benefit the partnership.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court found the jury instructions to be correct.
In the Matter of the Estate of Dudley B. Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026 (N.J. 1994)
Facts
The will provided that trustees should allocate stock dividends to income and allocate stock splits to principal but did not defined the terms.
Procedural History
The trial court adopted the New York Stock Exchange Rule that stock distributions were dividends if they constituted less than 25% of outstanding shares and splits if 25% or more. The Appellate Division reversed and relied on the traditional approach.
Issue(s)
Did the Appellate Court err in reversing the judgment of the trial court and rejecting the approach of the New York Stock Exchange?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the rule they adopted was similar to the trial courts test that a dividend is less than 25%. They went on to say that although 25% is usually the maximum share increase, a 25% cutoff may not work in every case. Courts should inquire into all the facts and circumstances including the effect of the distribution and the corporation’s description.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The will provided that trustees should allocate stock dividends to income and allocate stock splits to principal but did not defined the terms.
Procedural History
The trial court adopted the New York Stock Exchange Rule that stock distributions were dividends if they constituted less than 25% of outstanding shares and splits if 25% or more. The Appellate Division reversed and relied on the traditional approach.
Issue(s)
Did the Appellate Court err in reversing the judgment of the trial court and rejecting the approach of the New York Stock Exchange?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the rule they adopted was similar to the trial courts test that a dividend is less than 25%. They went on to say that although 25% is usually the maximum share increase, a 25% cutoff may not work in every case. Courts should inquire into all the facts and circumstances including the effect of the distribution and the corporation’s description.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court.
In the Matter of McDuffie, 440 S.E.2d 865 (N.C. App. 1994)
Facts
McDuffies owned properties which were sold to the Halls and to Summit Enterprises. A foreclosure proceeding was instituted and Mutual requested petitioner place a bid on their behalf. It was initially requested a bid be placed to extinguish the loan then changed to a bid of $1,000. Petitioner was never informed of the change and bid $43,361.17.
Procedural History
Judge denied petitioner’s motion to withdraw the bid.
Issue(s)
Did the judge err in refusing to withdraw the bid?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that petitioner acted within the scope of his apparent authority and Mutual is bound on the resulting contract despite the alleged mistaken bid.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
McDuffies owned properties which were sold to the Halls and to Summit Enterprises. A foreclosure proceeding was instituted and Mutual requested petitioner place a bid on their behalf. It was initially requested a bid be placed to extinguish the loan then changed to a bid of $1,000. Petitioner was never informed of the change and bid $43,361.17.
Procedural History
Judge denied petitioner’s motion to withdraw the bid.
Issue(s)
Did the judge err in refusing to withdraw the bid?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that petitioner acted within the scope of his apparent authority and Mutual is bound on the resulting contract despite the alleged mistaken bid.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)
Facts
Curtiss-Wright approved a dividend for the 4th quarter and authorized transmission of this to the NYSE. There was a delay in the transmission and was not reported until 1.5 hours later. After the meeting, Gintel was informed and he entered two sell orders, prior to the transmission and after the transmission NYSE had to suspend trading because of the number of sell orders.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that we and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them but which are not known to persons whom they deal with. Consequently, any sales by the insider must await disclosure of the information.
Curtiss-Wright approved a dividend for the 4th quarter and authorized transmission of this to the NYSE. There was a delay in the transmission and was not reported until 1.5 hours later. After the meeting, Gintel was informed and he entered two sell orders, prior to the transmission and after the transmission NYSE had to suspend trading because of the number of sell orders.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that we and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them but which are not known to persons whom they deal with. Consequently, any sales by the insider must await disclosure of the information.
In re PSE&G Shareholder Litigation, 718 A.2d 254 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1998)
Facts
Plaintiff shareholders demanded that PSE&G commence litigation against their officers and directors alleging mismanagement. The demand was rejected and Plaintiffs filed suit.
Procedural History
PSE&G moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court denied the motion and a motion for summary judgment was filed one year later.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found there are numerous procedures used by different jurisdictions in a derivative action. The Court felt that a concomitant to the universal demand rule would be to require the corporation to justify its refusal of a shareholder’s demand. Placing the burden of proof on the corporation is both logical and consistent with the responsibility that courts have in this area. Requiring the shareholders to allege facts places them in a position bordering on impossible. In determining whether a corporation has met its burden, the court would consider all relevant justifications for management’s determination.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court permitted limited discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff shareholders demanded that PSE&G commence litigation against their officers and directors alleging mismanagement. The demand was rejected and Plaintiffs filed suit.
Procedural History
PSE&G moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court denied the motion and a motion for summary judgment was filed one year later.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found there are numerous procedures used by different jurisdictions in a derivative action. The Court felt that a concomitant to the universal demand rule would be to require the corporation to justify its refusal of a shareholder’s demand. Placing the burden of proof on the corporation is both logical and consistent with the responsibility that courts have in this area. Requiring the shareholders to allege facts places them in a position bordering on impossible. In determining whether a corporation has met its burden, the court would consider all relevant justifications for management’s determination.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court permitted limited discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
Hill v. County Concrete Company, Inc., 672 A.2d 667 (Md. App. 1996)
Facts
Hill and Newman decided to start a concrete pouring business. They wanted to form the corporation under C & M Builders. An attorney advised the name was available and Hill and Newman began creating letterhead, business cards, etc. The application was not timely filed and when it was filed, C & M was gone. They instead filed under H & N Construction, Inc. Hill and Newman continued to use C & M as its trade name. County Concrete received an order from C & M and opened an account, which was defaulted on.
Procedural History
County Concrete sued C & M and filed for summary judgment. A default was entered against Newman and summary judgment was granted against C & M. County Concrete argued Hill was personally liable because C & M was not validly formed. Hill argued it was a de facto corporation, which the judge rejected.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in holding C & M was not a valid corporation and thus holding Hill personally liable?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Hill argued C & M was a de facto corporation based on County Concrete knowing it was dealing with a corporate entity and not with an individual. Hill relied on Cranson, which laid out the factors for determining a de facto corporation as: (1) a law authorizing corporations, (2) a good faith effort to incorporate, and (3) the use or exercise of corporate powers. Hill did not act in good faith after knowing C & M was not available but continued to use that corporate entity.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Hill and Newman decided to start a concrete pouring business. They wanted to form the corporation under C & M Builders. An attorney advised the name was available and Hill and Newman began creating letterhead, business cards, etc. The application was not timely filed and when it was filed, C & M was gone. They instead filed under H & N Construction, Inc. Hill and Newman continued to use C & M as its trade name. County Concrete received an order from C & M and opened an account, which was defaulted on.
Procedural History
County Concrete sued C & M and filed for summary judgment. A default was entered against Newman and summary judgment was granted against C & M. County Concrete argued Hill was personally liable because C & M was not validly formed. Hill argued it was a de facto corporation, which the judge rejected.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in holding C & M was not a valid corporation and thus holding Hill personally liable?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Hill argued C & M was a de facto corporation based on County Concrete knowing it was dealing with a corporate entity and not with an individual. Hill relied on Cranson, which laid out the factors for determining a de facto corporation as: (1) a law authorizing corporations, (2) a good faith effort to incorporate, and (3) the use or exercise of corporate powers. Hill did not act in good faith after knowing C & M was not available but continued to use that corporate entity.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Harrison v. NetCentric Corp., 744 N.E.2d 622 (Mass. 2001)
Facts
O’Sullivans and Harrison formed a business and in stock ownership agreement O’Sullivan received 4.5 million shares, Harrison 2.9 million shares, and other O’Sullivan 1.5 million shares. Harrison’s stock agreement stated that if Harrison ceased to be employed for any reason, the company had the right to buy back Harrison’s unvested shares. Harrison was terminated and 55% of his shares were not vested. NetCentric sought to repurchase unvested shares.
Procedural History
Harrison alleged NetCentric breached fiduciary duty, implied covenant of good faith and wrongful termination. Summary judgment was entered against Harrison.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to NetCentric?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the state of incorporation dictates the choice of law and because Delaware law does not impose a heightened fiduciary standard on shareholders in a close corporation, summary judgment was properly granted. NetCentric did not deprive Harrison of income and his unvested shares are not earned compensation, merely earned over time.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
O’Sullivans and Harrison formed a business and in stock ownership agreement O’Sullivan received 4.5 million shares, Harrison 2.9 million shares, and other O’Sullivan 1.5 million shares. Harrison’s stock agreement stated that if Harrison ceased to be employed for any reason, the company had the right to buy back Harrison’s unvested shares. Harrison was terminated and 55% of his shares were not vested. NetCentric sought to repurchase unvested shares.
Procedural History
Harrison alleged NetCentric breached fiduciary duty, implied covenant of good faith and wrongful termination. Summary judgment was entered against Harrison.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to NetCentric?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the state of incorporation dictates the choice of law and because Delaware law does not impose a heightened fiduciary standard on shareholders in a close corporation, summary judgment was properly granted. NetCentric did not deprive Harrison of income and his unvested shares are not earned compensation, merely earned over time.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Harris v. Looney, 862 S.W.2d 282 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993)
Facts
Harris sold his business to J & R Construction on 2/1/88. The articles of incorporation were signed on 2/1/88 but were not filed with the Secretary of State until 2/3/88. J & R defaulted on the contract.
Procedural History
Harris sued the incorporators for judgment jointly and severally. The court refused to hold Avanell Looney and Rita Alexander liable, but held Joe Alexander liable since he signed the contract.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in not holding all incorporators jointly and severally liable?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Harris argued Arkansas law imposes joint and several liability on those purporting to act as a corporation knowing there is no incorporation. The Court found the evidence on the record showed only Joe Alexander signed the contract and promissory note on behalf of the corporation. The only evidence to show a corporation was statements made by Joe and Avanell while present. This was disputed, however, that Avanell was not present. The trial judge has great discretion in dealing with the evidence.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Harris sold his business to J & R Construction on 2/1/88. The articles of incorporation were signed on 2/1/88 but were not filed with the Secretary of State until 2/3/88. J & R defaulted on the contract.
Procedural History
Harris sued the incorporators for judgment jointly and severally. The court refused to hold Avanell Looney and Rita Alexander liable, but held Joe Alexander liable since he signed the contract.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in not holding all incorporators jointly and severally liable?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Harris argued Arkansas law imposes joint and several liability on those purporting to act as a corporation knowing there is no incorporation. The Court found the evidence on the record showed only Joe Alexander signed the contract and promissory note on behalf of the corporation. The only evidence to show a corporation was statements made by Joe and Avanell while present. This was disputed, however, that Avanell was not present. The trial judge has great discretion in dealing with the evidence.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Grimes v. Donald, 1995 WL 54441 (Del. Ch.)
Facts
Donald was employed as the CEO of DSC. His contract contained a provision that if the board of directors unreasonably interfered with his management, that he may declare his employment terminated and qualify for payments.
Procedural History
Shareholders brought a declaratory action to invalidate the compensation agreement.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Section 141(a) permits a board of directors to delegate managerial duties. The board has broad discretion in fashioning a managerial structure appropriate in moving the corporation towards the achievement of corporate goals. The agreement with Donald does not formally foreclose DSC’s directors from exercising their business judgment. Not enough has been pleaded to permit a fact finder to infer the financial consequences flowing from the agreement with Donald would be such to render the agreement a de facto abdication of directorial obligation. It is thus appropriate to dismiss the claim.
Judgment/Outcome
The court dismissed the claim of the shareholder.
Donald was employed as the CEO of DSC. His contract contained a provision that if the board of directors unreasonably interfered with his management, that he may declare his employment terminated and qualify for payments.
Procedural History
Shareholders brought a declaratory action to invalidate the compensation agreement.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Section 141(a) permits a board of directors to delegate managerial duties. The board has broad discretion in fashioning a managerial structure appropriate in moving the corporation towards the achievement of corporate goals. The agreement with Donald does not formally foreclose DSC’s directors from exercising their business judgment. Not enough has been pleaded to permit a fact finder to infer the financial consequences flowing from the agreement with Donald would be such to render the agreement a de facto abdication of directorial obligation. It is thus appropriate to dismiss the claim.
Judgment/Outcome
The court dismissed the claim of the shareholder.
Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167 (Miss. 1989)
Facts
Fought, Morris, Strong, and Peyton formed Vicksburg Mold and Die. Each had 25 shares and they had a stock redemption agreement where if selling your shares, they would be offered to the company first. Strong left and the three remaining divided the shares. When Peyton was going to leave, Morris sought to buy all of Peyton’s shares and thus release Peyton as a guarantor of a note.
Procedural History
Fought sued but the chancellor concluded that Morris had not breached his fiduciary responsibility and denied all relief prayed for by Fought.
Issue(s)
Did the chancellor err in finding that Morris did not breach his fiduciary duty?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that where a majority shareholder stands to benefit as a controlling stockholder, the law requires the majority’s action to be intrinsically fair to the minority interest. Blind adherence to corporate statutes may not be used to circumvent corporate agreements. Morris’ intent in buying Peyton’s stock was to freeze out Fought. Morris therefore breached his fiduciary duty in purchasing all of Peyton’s stock, contrary to the Stock Redemption Agreement.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Fought, Morris, Strong, and Peyton formed Vicksburg Mold and Die. Each had 25 shares and they had a stock redemption agreement where if selling your shares, they would be offered to the company first. Strong left and the three remaining divided the shares. When Peyton was going to leave, Morris sought to buy all of Peyton’s shares and thus release Peyton as a guarantor of a note.
Procedural History
Fought sued but the chancellor concluded that Morris had not breached his fiduciary responsibility and denied all relief prayed for by Fought.
Issue(s)
Did the chancellor err in finding that Morris did not breach his fiduciary duty?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that where a majority shareholder stands to benefit as a controlling stockholder, the law requires the majority’s action to be intrinsically fair to the minority interest. Blind adherence to corporate statutes may not be used to circumvent corporate agreements. Morris’ intent in buying Peyton’s stock was to freeze out Fought. Morris therefore breached his fiduciary duty in purchasing all of Peyton’s stock, contrary to the Stock Redemption Agreement.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 695 A.2d 53 (Del. 1997)
Facts
Reid was driving on his way to obtain a work order, under his job with Townsends, when he was in an accident. Fisher was a passenger in Reid’s vehicle when Reid crashed.
Procedural History
The jury awarded Fisher $7 million against Reid. Summary judgment was entered in Townsends’ favor.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in granting summary judgment for Townsends?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that if the principal assumes the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work, an employer/employee agency relationship has been created. The foregoing evidence created a material dispute of whether Reid was Townsends’ employee.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Reid was driving on his way to obtain a work order, under his job with Townsends, when he was in an accident. Fisher was a passenger in Reid’s vehicle when Reid crashed.
Procedural History
The jury awarded Fisher $7 million against Reid. Summary judgment was entered in Townsends’ favor.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in granting summary judgment for Townsends?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that if the principal assumes the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work, an employer/employee agency relationship has been created. The foregoing evidence created a material dispute of whether Reid was Townsends’ employee.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
F.B.I. Farms, Inc. v. Moore, 798 N.E.2d 440 (Ind. 2003)
Facts
FBI was formed by the Burgers, their children, and the children’s spouses. Moore was divorced from Linda, child of Burger, in 1982. Linda was awarded all of the shares in the farm and Moore was awarded monetary judgment. Linda never satisfied the judgment and a sheriff’s sale commenced to sell the shares in the farm. Moore purchased the shares. There was a provision in the Board minutes that if any stock be offered for sale, the farm had the first opportunity to purchase the stock.
Procedural History
Moore sought a declaratory judgment that he owned the shares and they were unencumbered. The trial court found the transfer restrictions did not prevent the sheriff’s sale but two of the restrictions are unreasonable. The Court of Appeals found that Moore was not a shareholder at the time of purchase and thus not bound to offer the shares to the farm before he purchased them.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding the disputed transfer restrictions were unreasonable and thus unenforceable?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Court of Appeals missed the issue in the case; before Linda could transfer her shares, she was obliged to offer them to FBI and the other shareholders. FBI, however, was aware of the sale and did not nothing to stop the sale. FBI did have the right of first refusal, but failed to exercise it. Moore acquired the shares at the sheriff’s sale but not because the restrictions were inapplicable. The sheriff’s sale was an involuntary transfer. While Moore could purchase the shares, he was aware of the restrictions on the shares and thus could not acquire more property rights than were possessed by Linda.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
FBI was formed by the Burgers, their children, and the children’s spouses. Moore was divorced from Linda, child of Burger, in 1982. Linda was awarded all of the shares in the farm and Moore was awarded monetary judgment. Linda never satisfied the judgment and a sheriff’s sale commenced to sell the shares in the farm. Moore purchased the shares. There was a provision in the Board minutes that if any stock be offered for sale, the farm had the first opportunity to purchase the stock.
Procedural History
Moore sought a declaratory judgment that he owned the shares and they were unencumbered. The trial court found the transfer restrictions did not prevent the sheriff’s sale but two of the restrictions are unreasonable. The Court of Appeals found that Moore was not a shareholder at the time of purchase and thus not bound to offer the shares to the farm before he purchased them.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding the disputed transfer restrictions were unreasonable and thus unenforceable?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Court of Appeals missed the issue in the case; before Linda could transfer her shares, she was obliged to offer them to FBI and the other shareholders. FBI, however, was aware of the sale and did not nothing to stop the sale. FBI did have the right of first refusal, but failed to exercise it. Moore acquired the shares at the sheriff’s sale but not because the restrictions were inapplicable. The sheriff’s sale was an involuntary transfer. While Moore could purchase the shares, he was aware of the restrictions on the shares and thus could not acquire more property rights than were possessed by Linda.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005)
Facts
Broudo and others purchased stock in Dura on the public market. Broudo alleges Dura made false statements concerning profits and future FDA approval of an asthma device.
Procedural History
The Ninth Circuit held that the complaint adequately alleged loss causation because they have shown that the price on the date of purchase was inflated due to the misrepresentation.
Issue(s)
Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding loss causation was adequately pled?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the view of the Ninth Circuit was wrong in its statement of the law. An inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss. At the moment the transaction take place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss. Given the common law roots of the securities fraud action, it is not surprising that other circuits have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The statute makes clear private securities fraud actions are only where plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Broudo and others purchased stock in Dura on the public market. Broudo alleges Dura made false statements concerning profits and future FDA approval of an asthma device.
Procedural History
The Ninth Circuit held that the complaint adequately alleged loss causation because they have shown that the price on the date of purchase was inflated due to the misrepresentation.
Issue(s)
Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding loss causation was adequately pled?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the view of the Ninth Circuit was wrong in its statement of the law. An inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss. At the moment the transaction take place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss. Given the common law roots of the securities fraud action, it is not surprising that other circuits have rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The statute makes clear private securities fraud actions are only where plaintiffs adequately allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.Com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338 (Del. Ch.)
Facts
Sabre owned 70% of Travelocity’s shares and eventually bought the remainder not owned by Travelocity. A forced sale gives shareholders the right to receive a fair value for their shares.
Procedural History
Doft & Co. sued to obtain the fair value from the Court.
Issue(s)
What is the fair value of the shares?
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court came to the conclusion that no one is able to produce a reliable set of long-range projections for Travelocity. The Court decided to ignore both parties’ experts and used the comparable company approach, looking at Expedia as the comparable company. A 35% discount was applied to the valuation multiples derived from analysis of Expedia, giving a per share value of $32.76.
Sabre owned 70% of Travelocity’s shares and eventually bought the remainder not owned by Travelocity. A forced sale gives shareholders the right to receive a fair value for their shares.
Procedural History
Doft & Co. sued to obtain the fair value from the Court.
Issue(s)
What is the fair value of the shares?
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court came to the conclusion that no one is able to produce a reliable set of long-range projections for Travelocity. The Court decided to ignore both parties’ experts and used the comparable company approach, looking at Expedia as the comparable company. A 35% discount was applied to the valuation multiples derived from analysis of Expedia, giving a per share value of $32.76.
Detter v. Schreiber, 610 N.W.2d 13 (Neb. 2000)
Facts
Detter and Schreiber formed a corporation and in connection with, Schreiber executed two promissory notes totaling $19,000. Schreiber retained the services of Young, an attorney, to draft the shareholder agreement. Schreiber failed to pay the notes.
Procedural History
Detter sued for enforcement of the promissory notes. Schreiber was represented by Young and Detter moved to have Young removed for a conflict. Trial court found Young had a conflict of interest and sustainer Detter’s motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding a conflict of interest?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that preparation of the shareholder agreement would require Young to work with both Detter and Schreiber and to ascertain their financial and personal interests. Thus, it could be reasonably inferred Young had knowledge of the two promissory notes which are subject to the counterclaim.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Detter and Schreiber formed a corporation and in connection with, Schreiber executed two promissory notes totaling $19,000. Schreiber retained the services of Young, an attorney, to draft the shareholder agreement. Schreiber failed to pay the notes.
Procedural History
Detter sued for enforcement of the promissory notes. Schreiber was represented by Young and Detter moved to have Young removed for a conflict. Trial court found Young had a conflict of interest and sustainer Detter’s motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding a conflict of interest?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that preparation of the shareholder agreement would require Young to work with both Detter and Schreiber and to ascertain their financial and personal interests. Thus, it could be reasonably inferred Young had knowledge of the two promissory notes which are subject to the counterclaim.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1 (Del. 1993)
Facts
Compaq refused to allow Horton to inspect its stock ledger and other related materials. Horton had submitted a demand letter and Compaq refused, citing that the letter did not state a proper purpose under § 220(b).
Procedural History
Both parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment and the only issue remaining was whether Horton stated a proper purpose?
Issue(s)
Was the purpose for which Horton was requesting records proper enough to compel the production?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a stockholder’s right to inspect is not absolute and rather is qualified depending on the facts presented. Horton has nothing to gain by harming the legitimate interests of the company yet Compaq has no legitimate interest in avoiding payment of compensatory damages which it may owe to those who own the enterprise. The purpose for which Horton seeks the documents is proper. So long as Horton establishes a single proper purpose related to his role as a stockholder, all other purposes are irrelevant.
Compaq refused to allow Horton to inspect its stock ledger and other related materials. Horton had submitted a demand letter and Compaq refused, citing that the letter did not state a proper purpose under § 220(b).
Procedural History
Both parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment and the only issue remaining was whether Horton stated a proper purpose?
Issue(s)
Was the purpose for which Horton was requesting records proper enough to compel the production?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a stockholder’s right to inspect is not absolute and rather is qualified depending on the facts presented. Horton has nothing to gain by harming the legitimate interests of the company yet Compaq has no legitimate interest in avoiding payment of compensatory damages which it may owe to those who own the enterprise. The purpose for which Horton seeks the documents is proper. So long as Horton establishes a single proper purpose related to his role as a stockholder, all other purposes are irrelevant.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
Facts
Chiarella worked as a financial printer. Chiarella handled five announcements of corporate take-over bids. When they were given to Chiarella, the corporate information was removed by Chiarella was able to discern based on certain details. Chiarella purchased stock and sold as soon as takeovers were announced.
Procedural History
Chiarella was convicted on all counts of securities fraud and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in finding Chiarella guilty?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Chairella was convicted of being a corporate insider although he was not a corporate insider. In effect, the trial court instructed the jury Chiarella owed a duty to everyone. Chiarella was in fact a stranger who dealt with sellers only through impersonal transactions. A duty to disclose does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic information.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
Chiarella worked as a financial printer. Chiarella handled five announcements of corporate take-over bids. When they were given to Chiarella, the corporate information was removed by Chiarella was able to discern based on certain details. Chiarella purchased stock and sold as soon as takeovers were announced.
Procedural History
Chiarella was convicted on all counts of securities fraud and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in finding Chiarella guilty?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Chairella was convicted of being a corporate insider although he was not a corporate insider. In effect, the trial court instructed the jury Chiarella owed a duty to everyone. Chiarella was in fact a stranger who dealt with sellers only through impersonal transactions. A duty to disclose does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic information.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes, 47 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. 1991)
Facts
Whitcomb contacted Benjamin about doing plumbing work. In the first letter requesting a bid, Whitcomb’s signature acknowledged “For Response to Hunger Network” but was on Church World Service letterhead. In the letter accepting the bid, Whitcomb’s signature acknowledged “Canning Committee-RHN” and was on Response to Hunger Network letterhead. Whitcomb only paid half the bill.
Procedural History
Benjamin sued for the balance and in Whitcomb’s answer it was affirmatively asserted that “Response to Hunger Network, Inc. is a Wisconsin corporation.”
Issue(s)
Is an agent personally liable on a contract where the other party did not have notice of the corporate status of the principal at the time of contracting?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a corporation enters into contracts and incurs liability as a separate legal entity. It is the agent who seeks to escape liability who has the burden of proving that the principal’s corporate status was disclosed. There was no express disclosure of corporate status. Benjamin had no affirmative duty to investigate. The fact that RHN was a charitable organization does not lead to the inference that it was a corporation. Whitcomb is liable because he is the contracting party.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
Whitcomb contacted Benjamin about doing plumbing work. In the first letter requesting a bid, Whitcomb’s signature acknowledged “For Response to Hunger Network” but was on Church World Service letterhead. In the letter accepting the bid, Whitcomb’s signature acknowledged “Canning Committee-RHN” and was on Response to Hunger Network letterhead. Whitcomb only paid half the bill.
Procedural History
Benjamin sued for the balance and in Whitcomb’s answer it was affirmatively asserted that “Response to Hunger Network, Inc. is a Wisconsin corporation.”
Issue(s)
Is an agent personally liable on a contract where the other party did not have notice of the corporate status of the principal at the time of contracting?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a corporation enters into contracts and incurs liability as a separate legal entity. It is the agent who seeks to escape liability who has the burden of proving that the principal’s corporate status was disclosed. There was no express disclosure of corporate status. Benjamin had no affirmative duty to investigate. The fact that RHN was a charitable organization does not lead to the inference that it was a corporation. Whitcomb is liable because he is the contracting party.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
Beam v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961 (Del Ch. 2003)
Facts
Beam was a shareholder of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia. Beam brought a derivative action.
Procedural History
Defendants sought to dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with the demand requirement and for failure to adequately plead demand excusal.
Issue(s)
Did the Complaint fail to adequately plead why demand would be futile?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Count I alleges that Stewart breached her fiduciary duties. Because this does not challenge an action by the Board, the appropriate test is whether the particularized allegations create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint was filed, the Board could have properly exercised its independent judgment and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand. Beam offers various theories but fails to plead sufficient facts that could permit the Court to reasonably infer that one or more of the theories could be accurate.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court dismissed the Complaint.
Beam was a shareholder of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia. Beam brought a derivative action.
Procedural History
Defendants sought to dismiss the Complaint for failure to comply with the demand requirement and for failure to adequately plead demand excusal.
Issue(s)
Did the Complaint fail to adequately plead why demand would be futile?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Count I alleges that Stewart breached her fiduciary duties. Because this does not challenge an action by the Board, the appropriate test is whether the particularized allegations create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint was filed, the Board could have properly exercised its independent judgment and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand. Beam offers various theories but fails to plead sufficient facts that could permit the Court to reasonably infer that one or more of the theories could be accurate.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court dismissed the Complaint.
Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2000)
Facts
Basile had gone to H & R Block for tax preparation purposes and elected to receive a refund anticipation loan. These loans were offered by H & R Block, along with other options of receiving your refund, sent to Mellon Bank for approval and if approved, a refund check was sent in a few days.
Procedural History
Basile filed a class action suit against H & R Block and Mellon alleging Mellon participated with Block in practices to deceive consumers to the true nature of the loans. Trial judge granted Block’s motion for summary judgment.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in granting the motion for summary judgment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there was no showing Basile intended Block to act on their behalf in securing loans. Block actually offered three options, only one of which involved loans. Block simply facilitated the loan process by presenting Basile to Mellon Bank as viable candidates.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Basile had gone to H & R Block for tax preparation purposes and elected to receive a refund anticipation loan. These loans were offered by H & R Block, along with other options of receiving your refund, sent to Mellon Bank for approval and if approved, a refund check was sent in a few days.
Procedural History
Basile filed a class action suit against H & R Block and Mellon alleging Mellon participated with Block in practices to deceive consumers to the true nature of the loans. Trial judge granted Block’s motion for summary judgment.
Issue(s)
Did the trial judge err in granting the motion for summary judgment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there was no showing Basile intended Block to act on their behalf in securing loans. Block actually offered three options, only one of which involved loans. Block simply facilitated the loan process by presenting Basile to Mellon Bank as viable candidates.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)
Facts
Basic was a publicly traded company which made three public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations. Basic’s board approved the merger between them and Combustion.
Procedural History
Respondents, who were shareholders prior to the merger, sued, asserting Basic made false or misleading statements. The trial court granted summary judgment.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts properly apply a presumption of reliance in certifying the class, rather than requiring each class member to show direct reliance?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that to fulfill the materiality requirement, there must have been a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as significantly altering the total mix of available information. Whether merger discussions are material therefore depend on the facts. The fraud on the market theory is that in an open ended market, the price of stock is determined by available information. Requiring a plaintiff to show speculative facts would place an unreal burden on the plaintiff. Any showing that severs the link between alleged misrepresentation and either the price received by plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Basic was a publicly traded company which made three public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations. Basic’s board approved the merger between them and Combustion.
Procedural History
Respondents, who were shareholders prior to the merger, sued, asserting Basic made false or misleading statements. The trial court granted summary judgment.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts properly apply a presumption of reliance in certifying the class, rather than requiring each class member to show direct reliance?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that to fulfill the materiality requirement, there must have been a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as significantly altering the total mix of available information. Whether merger discussions are material therefore depend on the facts. The fraud on the market theory is that in an open ended market, the price of stock is determined by available information. Requiring a plaintiff to show speculative facts would place an unreal burden on the plaintiff. Any showing that severs the link between alleged misrepresentation and either the price received by plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Baltrusch v. Baltrusch, 83 P.3d 256 (Mont. 2004)
Facts
The Baltrusches are brothers who formed a business, which expanded into several other businesses. They had acquired leases, which Otto’s sons helped farm. When the leases became economically disadvantageous, he offered the leases to his sons. The sons needed a tractor, which they acquired from Baltrusches partnership in exchange for paying labor wages. The Baltrusch partnership broke up and litigation ensued for distribution of the property.
Procedural History
The District Court decided that all property owned jointly be sold, with the proceeds divided equally.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in not finding Otto liable for (1) his conversion of partnership equipment, (2) his failure to charge rent for the equipment, and (3) personal credit card expenses for which the partnership paid?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Otto did not breach his duty of loyalty, as his duty was to account to the partnership for any property or benefit he received, and he did just that. The sons paid for the tractor by paying the wages of Otto’s hired hand. As to the credit card, William had ample time to inspect the credit card invoices and we conclude the District Court did not err in finding random sampling insufficient to charge Otto for all of the years of credit card expenses.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
The Baltrusches are brothers who formed a business, which expanded into several other businesses. They had acquired leases, which Otto’s sons helped farm. When the leases became economically disadvantageous, he offered the leases to his sons. The sons needed a tractor, which they acquired from Baltrusches partnership in exchange for paying labor wages. The Baltrusch partnership broke up and litigation ensued for distribution of the property.
Procedural History
The District Court decided that all property owned jointly be sold, with the proceeds divided equally.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in not finding Otto liable for (1) his conversion of partnership equipment, (2) his failure to charge rent for the equipment, and (3) personal credit card expenses for which the partnership paid?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Otto did not breach his duty of loyalty, as his duty was to account to the partnership for any property or benefit he received, and he did just that. The sons paid for the tractor by paying the wages of Otto’s hired hand. As to the credit card, William had ample time to inspect the credit card invoices and we conclude the District Court did not err in finding random sampling insufficient to charge Otto for all of the years of credit card expenses.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
Facts
Morse entered into a contract with Durbano and Garn, acting as officers of AVSI, to purchase a carwash. Durbano had not filed the Articles of Incorporation before the contract was executed.
Procedural History
Morses filed suit against Durbano and Garn for enforcement of the promissory notes. They alleged the corporation did not legally exist when the parties entered into the contract. Trial court held that AVSI was a corporation by estoppel.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in holding AVSI was a corporation by estoppel?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there is dispute in the jurisdictions on the characteristics of a corporation by estoppel. But given the ease of incorporating, the Court was hesitant to carve exceptions to the statutory grounds of holding individuals who assume to act as a corporation before the corporation exists jointly and severally liable. Durbano and Garn had actual knowledge AVSI did not exist and thus neither of them can invoke the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Morse entered into a contract with Durbano and Garn, acting as officers of AVSI, to purchase a carwash. Durbano had not filed the Articles of Incorporation before the contract was executed.
Procedural History
Morses filed suit against Durbano and Garn for enforcement of the promissory notes. They alleged the corporation did not legally exist when the parties entered into the contract. Trial court held that AVSI was a corporation by estoppel.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in holding AVSI was a corporation by estoppel?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there is dispute in the jurisdictions on the characteristics of a corporation by estoppel. But given the ease of incorporating, the Court was hesitant to carve exceptions to the statutory grounds of holding individuals who assume to act as a corporation before the corporation exists jointly and severally liable. Durbano and Garn had actual knowledge AVSI did not exist and thus neither of them can invoke the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)
Facts
Wilson made a series of narcotics sales to police informant. The police applied for, and were granted, a search and arrest warrant. Officers arrived, finding the main door open but the screen door closed. Officers entered, then identified themselves and that they had a warrant.
Procedural History
Wilson moved to suppress the evidence seized from the search and the trial court denied the motion. The Arkansas Supreme court affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the Arkansas Supreme Court err in finding that the knock and announce principle is not required by the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the knock and announce principle is deeply rooted in the common law and given the longstanding common-law endorsement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Wilson made a series of narcotics sales to police informant. The police applied for, and were granted, a search and arrest warrant. Officers arrived, finding the main door open but the screen door closed. Officers entered, then identified themselves and that they had a warrant.
Procedural History
Wilson moved to suppress the evidence seized from the search and the trial court denied the motion. The Arkansas Supreme court affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the Arkansas Supreme Court err in finding that the knock and announce principle is not required by the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the knock and announce principle is deeply rooted in the common law and given the longstanding common-law endorsement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
Facts
Armed robber entered cab company and stole $363. Two cab drivers followed the man to his address and called the police. Mrs. Hayden answered and officers asked if they could search the house; she consented. Hayden was found upstairs and guns and ammunition were found in other rooms upstairs.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals found that neither the entry without a warrant nor the search for Hayden without a warrant was invalid.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. The officers were justified in searching for weapons because they knew the robber was armed.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Armed robber entered cab company and stole $363. Two cab drivers followed the man to his address and called the police. Mrs. Hayden answered and officers asked if they could search the house; she consented. Hayden was found upstairs and guns and ammunition were found in other rooms upstairs.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals found that neither the entry without a warrant nor the search for Hayden without a warrant was invalid.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. The officers were justified in searching for weapons because they knew the robber was armed.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
Facts
A federal bank was robbed when a teller and vice president were the only people present. Wade was indicted and arrested for the robbery then had counsel appointed. An FBI agent conducted a lineup without notice to Wade’s counsel. Both employees identified Wade.
Procedural History
The employees identified Wade in the courtroom and the lineup was elicited. Wade moved for acquittal or to strike the courtroom identification. The trial court denied the motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in not striking the courtroom identification when the previous lineup was conducted outside the presence of Wade’s counsel?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there is nothing to show the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination but the lineup should have been excluded because it was conducted without notice to and in the absence of his counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantee applies to “critical” stages of the proceedings. The accused’s inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness’ courtroom identification. There can be little doubt that the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution. The proper test to be applied is that from Wong Sun.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
A federal bank was robbed when a teller and vice president were the only people present. Wade was indicted and arrested for the robbery then had counsel appointed. An FBI agent conducted a lineup without notice to Wade’s counsel. Both employees identified Wade.
Procedural History
The employees identified Wade in the courtroom and the lineup was elicited. Wade moved for acquittal or to strike the courtroom identification. The trial court denied the motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in not striking the courtroom identification when the previous lineup was conducted outside the presence of Wade’s counsel?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there is nothing to show the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination but the lineup should have been excluded because it was conducted without notice to and in the absence of his counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantee applies to “critical” stages of the proceedings. The accused’s inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness’ courtroom identification. There can be little doubt that the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution. The proper test to be applied is that from Wong Sun.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
Facts
Veronia School District began to see problems with drug use in its schools and felt that athletes were among the largest users. After a parent meeting, the District implemented a drug testing policy for all student athletes, which required a test at the beginning of the season and random tests throughout the season. Acton and his parents refused to sign the testing consent forms.
Procedural History
The Actons filed for a declaratory judgment and an injunction, but the District Court denied the claims. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the District’s policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue(s)
Did the Ninth Circuit err in finding that a school district’s policy of drug testing student athletes is a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional when special needs make the warrant and probable cause requirements impractical. These special needs have been found to exist in the public-school context. Fourth Amendment rights are different in public schools; the reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the school’s custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. When looking at all of the factors – decreased expectation of privacy, relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search – we conclude Veronia’s policy is reasonable and hence constitutional.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
Veronia School District began to see problems with drug use in its schools and felt that athletes were among the largest users. After a parent meeting, the District implemented a drug testing policy for all student athletes, which required a test at the beginning of the season and random tests throughout the season. Acton and his parents refused to sign the testing consent forms.
Procedural History
The Actons filed for a declaratory judgment and an injunction, but the District Court denied the claims. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the District’s policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issue(s)
Did the Ninth Circuit err in finding that a school district’s policy of drug testing student athletes is a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional when special needs make the warrant and probable cause requirements impractical. These special needs have been found to exist in the public-school context. Fourth Amendment rights are different in public schools; the reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the school’s custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. When looking at all of the factors – decreased expectation of privacy, relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search – we conclude Veronia’s policy is reasonable and hence constitutional.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)
Facts
Officers observed a vehicle approach Vale’s home. Vale came out to meet the vehicle, looking around the entire time. Vale returned to his house then went back to the vehicle. Officers assumed a narcotics sale was occurring and went to intervene. Vale returned to his house but was told to stop at his front steps. Officers entered the home based on the witnessed transaction and discovered narcotics in a rear bedroom.
Procedural History
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the search of the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it occurred in the immediate vicinity of the arrest.
Issue(s)
Did the Louisiana Supreme Court err?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a search may be incident to an arrest only if it substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. The officers here were not responding to an emergency and were not in his pursuit of a fleeing felon. We decline to hold that an arrest on the street can provide its own exigent circumstance so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee’s house.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Officers observed a vehicle approach Vale’s home. Vale came out to meet the vehicle, looking around the entire time. Vale returned to his house then went back to the vehicle. Officers assumed a narcotics sale was occurring and went to intervene. Vale returned to his house but was told to stop at his front steps. Officers entered the home based on the witnessed transaction and discovered narcotics in a rear bedroom.
Procedural History
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the search of the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it occurred in the immediate vicinity of the arrest.
Issue(s)
Did the Louisiana Supreme Court err?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a search may be incident to an arrest only if it substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. The officers here were not responding to an emergency and were not in his pursuit of a fleeing felon. We decline to hold that an arrest on the street can provide its own exigent circumstance so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee’s house.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
Facts
White and Jackson, an informant, had conversations regarding narcotics transactions. The informant was wearing a radio transmitter so agents could overhear the conversations.
Procedural History
Jackson could not be located for trial and the trial court overruled objections of to the agents’ testimony who conducted the surveillance. White was found guilty by a jury and the Court of Appeals reversed, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to forbid the introduction of the agents’ testimony in the circumstances.
Issue(s)
Does the Fourth Amendment bar testimony of government agents who related conversations overheard from a radio transmitter?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that based on Hoffa and Lewis, if the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
White and Jackson, an informant, had conversations regarding narcotics transactions. The informant was wearing a radio transmitter so agents could overhear the conversations.
Procedural History
Jackson could not be located for trial and the trial court overruled objections of to the agents’ testimony who conducted the surveillance. White was found guilty by a jury and the Court of Appeals reversed, interpreting the Fourth Amendment to forbid the introduction of the agents’ testimony in the circumstances.
Issue(s)
Does the Fourth Amendment bar testimony of government agents who related conversations overheard from a radio transmitter?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that based on Hoffa and Lewis, if the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later offered in evidence.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883 (1990)
Facts
It was thought that Turner was selling narcotics and the police employed a paid informant. It was discovered through this informant that Turner kept weapons in the apartment for his drug operation. A search warrant was issued and officers recovered weapons, ammunition, and narcotics equipment. The grand jury subsequently indicted Turner, an arrest warrant was issued, and officers entered an apartment and found Turner with a .45 caliber in the sheets. Turner was arrested and taken to another room. Officers discovered a rifle, ammunition, and baggies of cocaine.
Procedural History
The district court denied Turner’s motion to suppress and Turner was convicted.
Issue(s)
Did the district court err in denying Turner’s motion to suppress when the search occurred after Turner was removed to a different room?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found a two part inquiry best serve’s the issue: (1) whether the search was within the arrestee’s immediate control when he was arrested and (2) whether events occurring after the arrest but before the search made the search unreasonable. The Court found that the baggies of cocaine were within Turner’s control when he was arrested and that the events after the arrest but before the search did not make the search unreasonable. Turner was removed from the room for officer safety.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
It was thought that Turner was selling narcotics and the police employed a paid informant. It was discovered through this informant that Turner kept weapons in the apartment for his drug operation. A search warrant was issued and officers recovered weapons, ammunition, and narcotics equipment. The grand jury subsequently indicted Turner, an arrest warrant was issued, and officers entered an apartment and found Turner with a .45 caliber in the sheets. Turner was arrested and taken to another room. Officers discovered a rifle, ammunition, and baggies of cocaine.
Procedural History
The district court denied Turner’s motion to suppress and Turner was convicted.
Issue(s)
Did the district court err in denying Turner’s motion to suppress when the search occurred after Turner was removed to a different room?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found a two part inquiry best serve’s the issue: (1) whether the search was within the arrestee’s immediate control when he was arrested and (2) whether events occurring after the arrest but before the search made the search unreasonable. The Court found that the baggies of cocaine were within Turner’s control when he was arrested and that the events after the arrest but before the search did not make the search unreasonable. Turner was removed from the room for officer safety.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)
Facts
Cooke was on patrol when he noticed a suspicious camper and car. Cooke called for assistance, and after following for some distance, they pulled the car over but the camper sped off. The camper was pulled over a ½ mile later. Cooke went to assist with the camper, asked Savage if he could search the camper, and after being told no, smelt marijuana and searched anyways. The camper contained bales of marijuana.
Procedural History
The District Court denied the motion to suppress and the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing, finding that the length of the detention was unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that based on the circumstances surrounding the stop of Savage, the detention clearly met the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness. In assessing whether a detention is too long, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.
Judgment/Outcome
The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Cooke was on patrol when he noticed a suspicious camper and car. Cooke called for assistance, and after following for some distance, they pulled the car over but the camper sped off. The camper was pulled over a ½ mile later. Cooke went to assist with the camper, asked Savage if he could search the camper, and after being told no, smelt marijuana and searched anyways. The camper contained bales of marijuana.
Procedural History
The District Court denied the motion to suppress and the Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing, finding that the length of the detention was unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that based on the circumstances surrounding the stop of Savage, the detention clearly met the Fourth Amendment’s standard of reasonableness. In assessing whether a detention is too long, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.
Judgment/Outcome
The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
United States v. Santana
Facts
Undercover officer was attempting to make a heroin buy from McCafferty. McCafferty drove officer to Santana’s residence, McCafferty went inside, then returned with heroin. McCafferty was placed under arrest and other officers went to Santana’s home, finding her standing in the doorway. As the officers approached, Santana went inside and officers proceeded inside, discovering narcotics and the marked bills from the transaction.
Procedural History
Trial court granted Santana’s motion to suppress and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in suppressing the evidence retrieved from the search when Santana was noticed standing in the doorway?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that it is clear that Santana was in a public place and not where she had an expectation of privacy. The act of retreating into the house could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest. A suspect may not defeat arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by the expedient of escaping into a private place.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
Undercover officer was attempting to make a heroin buy from McCafferty. McCafferty drove officer to Santana’s residence, McCafferty went inside, then returned with heroin. McCafferty was placed under arrest and other officers went to Santana’s home, finding her standing in the doorway. As the officers approached, Santana went inside and officers proceeded inside, discovering narcotics and the marked bills from the transaction.
Procedural History
Trial court granted Santana’s motion to suppress and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in suppressing the evidence retrieved from the search when Santana was noticed standing in the doorway?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that it is clear that Santana was in a public place and not where she had an expectation of privacy. The act of retreating into the house could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest. A suspect may not defeat arrest which has been set in motion in a public place by the expedient of escaping into a private place.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the lower courts.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
Facts
Robinson was stopped by Jenks for operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his permit. Robinson and the occupants emerged from the vehicle and Jenks informed Robinson he was under arrest. While patting Robinson down, Jenks felt an object in the coat, which he removed and discovered was a crumpled cigarette pack. Jenks then opened the cigarette pack and discovered gelatin capsules of heroin.
Procedural History
The heroin seized from Robinson was admitted as evidence in his trial and Robinson was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Was the officer’s search of the crumpled cigarette package, which Jenks admitted he did not know what was inside, a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Court of Appeals holding that the officer may only conduct a limited frisk, per Terry v. Ohio, was incorrect because Terry does not carry over to a probable cause arrest. The Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeals finding that a stop for driving on a suspended license is less likely to discover weapons than a different stop. The Court found that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Robinson was stopped by Jenks for operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his permit. Robinson and the occupants emerged from the vehicle and Jenks informed Robinson he was under arrest. While patting Robinson down, Jenks felt an object in the coat, which he removed and discovered was a crumpled cigarette pack. Jenks then opened the cigarette pack and discovered gelatin capsules of heroin.
Procedural History
The heroin seized from Robinson was admitted as evidence in his trial and Robinson was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Was the officer’s search of the crumpled cigarette package, which Jenks admitted he did not know what was inside, a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Court of Appeals holding that the officer may only conduct a limited frisk, per Terry v. Ohio, was incorrect because Terry does not carry over to a probable cause arrest. The Court also disagreed with the Court of Appeals finding that a stop for driving on a suspended license is less likely to discover weapons than a different stop. The Court found that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)
Facts
Mendenhall was walking through Detroit Metropolitan Airport when she was approached by narcotics agents. After some questions, the agents asked if Mendenhall would come to the DEA office, which she did. After entering the office, Mendenhall also allegedly consented to a search, where heroin was found on her.
Procedural History
The District Court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the initial approach of Mendenhall was permissible under Terry. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the search was not consented, but a product of earlier official conduct violative of the Fourth Amendment.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in finding that the narcotics agents’ initial questioning of Mendenhall was permissible?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a person is seized only when, by means of physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy. On the facts of this case, no seizure of Mendenhall occurred.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Mendenhall was walking through Detroit Metropolitan Airport when she was approached by narcotics agents. After some questions, the agents asked if Mendenhall would come to the DEA office, which she did. After entering the office, Mendenhall also allegedly consented to a search, where heroin was found on her.
Procedural History
The District Court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the initial approach of Mendenhall was permissible under Terry. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the search was not consented, but a product of earlier official conduct violative of the Fourth Amendment.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in finding that the narcotics agents’ initial questioning of Mendenhall was permissible?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that a person is seized only when, by means of physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy. On the facts of this case, no seizure of Mendenhall occurred.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
Facts
An informant of unproven reliability tipped the Burbank Police Department that Armando and Patsy were selling drugs from their residence. Police investigated and began to track individuals with a history of drug transactions coming and going from the residence. The police requested a search warrant, which was issued. The search turned up substantial quantities of cocaine and methaqualone.
Procedural History
Respondents moved to suppress the evidence. The District Court suppressed in part, finding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause but also that none of the respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. The Court also found Officer Rombach acted in good faith.
Issue(s)
Does the exclusionary rule provide for an exception based on “good faith” of the officer?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court looked at the history of exceptions created to the exclusionary rule and also found that they had yet to recognize a good-faith exception. But the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged upon us. The marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. As applied to the facts, Officer Rombach’s affidavit was based on extensive investigation and the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
An informant of unproven reliability tipped the Burbank Police Department that Armando and Patsy were selling drugs from their residence. Police investigated and began to track individuals with a history of drug transactions coming and going from the residence. The police requested a search warrant, which was issued. The search turned up substantial quantities of cocaine and methaqualone.
Procedural History
Respondents moved to suppress the evidence. The District Court suppressed in part, finding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause but also that none of the respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. The Court also found Officer Rombach acted in good faith.
Issue(s)
Does the exclusionary rule provide for an exception based on “good faith” of the officer?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court looked at the history of exceptions created to the exclusionary rule and also found that they had yet to recognize a good-faith exception. But the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged upon us. The marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. As applied to the facts, Officer Rombach’s affidavit was based on extensive investigation and the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
United States v. Draper, 358 U.S. 307 (1959)
Facts
Marsh was a narcotics agent who used the assistance of Hereford for tips. Hereford had been reliable in the past. Hereford told Marsh that Draper was selling drugs and would be arriving in Denver on one of two days with heroin. Hereford described Draper, down to what he would be wearing. Marsh saw Draper at the train station, stopped him, and in his search, discovered two envelopes containing heroin.
Procedural History
The District Court found that Marsh had probable cause to stop Draper without a warrant and denied the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in finding that the description of Draper was sufficient to provide probable cause for the stop of Draper?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Draper argued (1) that the evidence was hearsay and could not have been considered and (2) Marsh’s information should be held insufficient to show probable cause. The Court disagreed with Draper’s contentions and found that with every bit of Hereford’s information being verified, Marsh had reasonable grounds to believe that Draper would have heroin. We deal with probabilities, factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Douglas dissented stating that if an arrest is made without a warrant, the offense must be committed in the presence of the officer or the officer must have reasonable grounds. The arresting officer did not have a bit of evidence.
Marsh was a narcotics agent who used the assistance of Hereford for tips. Hereford had been reliable in the past. Hereford told Marsh that Draper was selling drugs and would be arriving in Denver on one of two days with heroin. Hereford described Draper, down to what he would be wearing. Marsh saw Draper at the train station, stopped him, and in his search, discovered two envelopes containing heroin.
Procedural History
The District Court found that Marsh had probable cause to stop Draper without a warrant and denied the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in finding that the description of Draper was sufficient to provide probable cause for the stop of Draper?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
Draper argued (1) that the evidence was hearsay and could not have been considered and (2) Marsh’s information should be held insufficient to show probable cause. The Court disagreed with Draper’s contentions and found that with every bit of Hereford’s information being verified, Marsh had reasonable grounds to believe that Draper would have heroin. We deal with probabilities, factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Douglas dissented stating that if an arrest is made without a warrant, the offense must be committed in the presence of the officer or the officer must have reasonable grounds. The arresting officer did not have a bit of evidence.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
Facts
Amtrak officials noticed a footlocker was suspicious and alerted DEA agents in Boston. When arriving in Boston, the police dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance without alerting Machado and Leary. Chadwick met Machado and Leary and the three went to Chadwick’s car, when they were stopped. The footlocker was taken with the three arrestees to the federal building and was searched 1.5 hours after the arrests.
Procedural History
Respondents moved to suppress the marijuana obtained from the footlocker and the District Court held that the footlocker was not part of the area from which respondents might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in suppressing the evidence obtained from the footlocker as not being within the area of gaining possession?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that to safeguard himself and others, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless search of the arrestee and the area within their immediate control. Warrantless searches of luggage or property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest wither if the search is remote in time or place from the arrest.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
Amtrak officials noticed a footlocker was suspicious and alerted DEA agents in Boston. When arriving in Boston, the police dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance without alerting Machado and Leary. Chadwick met Machado and Leary and the three went to Chadwick’s car, when they were stopped. The footlocker was taken with the three arrestees to the federal building and was searched 1.5 hours after the arrests.
Procedural History
Respondents moved to suppress the marijuana obtained from the footlocker and the District Court held that the footlocker was not part of the area from which respondents might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in suppressing the evidence obtained from the footlocker as not being within the area of gaining possession?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that to safeguard himself and others, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless search of the arrestee and the area within their immediate control. Warrantless searches of luggage or property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest wither if the search is remote in time or place from the arrest.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989)
Facts
Postal inspectors placed marked bills and a bearer check in mail trays and tracked the stolen checks to Carter. Carter was interviewed in the bank president’s office by the inspectors and bank security manager for 1.5 hours. After obtaining incriminating statements, Carter was informed of his Miranda rights and he signed a handwritten admission of guilt.
Procedural History
Carter moved to suppress his statements and the bait money and the district court granted the motion, finding the interrogation occurred in a custodial setting.
Issue(s)
Did the district court err in suppressing the evidence on the grounds that the interrogation was in a custodial setting and that Carter’s statements were not voluntary?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in evaluating the factors of Carter’s interrogation (bank president’s office, isolation from others, not free to leave, and the length of interrogation) we discern no clear error in the conclusion that Carter could have reasonably believed the interrogation was custodial in nature.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Postal inspectors placed marked bills and a bearer check in mail trays and tracked the stolen checks to Carter. Carter was interviewed in the bank president’s office by the inspectors and bank security manager for 1.5 hours. After obtaining incriminating statements, Carter was informed of his Miranda rights and he signed a handwritten admission of guilt.
Procedural History
Carter moved to suppress his statements and the bait money and the district court granted the motion, finding the interrogation occurred in a custodial setting.
Issue(s)
Did the district court err in suppressing the evidence on the grounds that the interrogation was in a custodial setting and that Carter’s statements were not voluntary?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in evaluating the factors of Carter’s interrogation (bank president’s office, isolation from others, not free to leave, and the length of interrogation) we discern no clear error in the conclusion that Carter could have reasonably believed the interrogation was custodial in nature.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)
Facts
A robbery was committed at a bank by a man wearing a stocking mask, waiving a pistol, and another entered, gathering the money. An informer told authorities that he had discussed the robbery with Ash and photos, including one of Ash, were shown to four witnesses. All four made uncertain identifications. In preparation for trial, the witnesses were shown a photographic display to determine whether the witnesses could make in-court identifications.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals held that Ash’s right to counsel was violated when his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present at the photographic displays.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Wade recognized times where the subsequent trial would cure a one-sided confrontation between prosecuting authorities and an uncounseled defendant. Such stages were not critical. Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the photographic display, no liability arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. We are not persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
A robbery was committed at a bank by a man wearing a stocking mask, waiving a pistol, and another entered, gathering the money. An informer told authorities that he had discussed the robbery with Ash and photos, including one of Ash, were shown to four witnesses. All four made uncertain identifications. In preparation for trial, the witnesses were shown a photographic display to determine whether the witnesses could make in-court identifications.
Procedural History
The Court of Appeals held that Ash’s right to counsel was violated when his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present at the photographic displays.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that Wade recognized times where the subsequent trial would cure a one-sided confrontation between prosecuting authorities and an uncounseled defendant. Such stages were not critical. Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the photographic display, no liability arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. We are not persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Thornton v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004)
Facts
Nichols was driving an unmarked police car and noticed that Thornton seemed to avoid driving next to him. Nichols pulled off onto a side street and ran the tags on Nichols car. He discovered that the tags were for a two-door Chevrolet, not Thornton’s Lincoln Town Car. Thornton had pulled into a parking lot and Nichols stopped Thornton as he was walking from the car. After searching Thornton, with his consent, and discovering narcotics, Thornton was placed under arrest. Nichols then search Thornton’s car, finding a 9mm handgun under the driver’s seat.
Procedural History
Thornton sought to suppress the handgun but the District Court denied the motion. Thornton was convicted on all three counts.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in admitting the evidence of the handgun when Thornton had been arrested and placed in the patrol car before the search occurred?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents no identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle. It is unlikely that Thornton could have reached for the gun after he was outside his automobile, but the need for a clear rule justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated. So long as an arrestee is the sort of recent occupant of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Nichols was driving an unmarked police car and noticed that Thornton seemed to avoid driving next to him. Nichols pulled off onto a side street and ran the tags on Nichols car. He discovered that the tags were for a two-door Chevrolet, not Thornton’s Lincoln Town Car. Thornton had pulled into a parking lot and Nichols stopped Thornton as he was walking from the car. After searching Thornton, with his consent, and discovering narcotics, Thornton was placed under arrest. Nichols then search Thornton’s car, finding a 9mm handgun under the driver’s seat.
Procedural History
Thornton sought to suppress the handgun but the District Court denied the motion. Thornton was convicted on all three counts.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in admitting the evidence of the handgun when Thornton had been arrested and placed in the patrol car before the search occurred?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents no identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle. It is unlikely that Thornton could have reached for the gun after he was outside his automobile, but the need for a clear rule justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated. So long as an arrestee is the sort of recent occupant of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Facts
Chilton and Terry were standing on a street corner and being observed by McFadden. Chilton and Terry would alternate walking down the street, peering in a store window, then returning to the corner. McFadden followed the men when they left and approached them, along with Katz. He asked for their names, then spun Terry around and patted the outside of his clothing. The men were directed into a store, where they were searched and McFadden removed a gun from both Terry and Chilton.
Procedural History
Terry and Chilton moved to suppress the guns and the court denied the motion, stating that McFadden had reasonable cause.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in finding that McFadden had reasonable cause to stop and frisk Terry, thus making it a valid search under the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons where the officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual. It would be unreasonable for officers to take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the individuals were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts.
Chilton and Terry were standing on a street corner and being observed by McFadden. Chilton and Terry would alternate walking down the street, peering in a store window, then returning to the corner. McFadden followed the men when they left and approached them, along with Katz. He asked for their names, then spun Terry around and patted the outside of his clothing. The men were directed into a store, where they were searched and McFadden removed a gun from both Terry and Chilton.
Procedural History
Terry and Chilton moved to suppress the guns and the court denied the motion, stating that McFadden had reasonable cause.
Issue(s)
Did the lower courts err in finding that McFadden had reasonable cause to stop and frisk Terry, thus making it a valid search under the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons where the officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual. It would be unreasonable for officers to take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. McFadden confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the individuals were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory search.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts.
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)
Facts
Officers arrived at hotel where they believed Stoner was staying. They asked the night clerk whether Stoner lived there and if they could search his room. The night clerk escorted them there and during their search, discovered glasses, a jacket, and a .45 caliber pistol.
Procedural History
Stoner moved to suppress the items found in the room, but the court denied his motion.
Issue(s)
Was the search of Stoner’s hotel room lawful because it was based upon the consent of the hotel clerk?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that it was the petitioner’s constitutional right which was at stake, not the hotel clerk’s. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed. This search without a warrant was unlawful.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Officers arrived at hotel where they believed Stoner was staying. They asked the night clerk whether Stoner lived there and if they could search his room. The night clerk escorted them there and during their search, discovered glasses, a jacket, and a .45 caliber pistol.
Procedural History
Stoner moved to suppress the items found in the room, but the court denied his motion.
Issue(s)
Was the search of Stoner’s hotel room lawful because it was based upon the consent of the hotel clerk?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that it was the petitioner’s constitutional right which was at stake, not the hotel clerk’s. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed. This search without a warrant was unlawful.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817 (R.I. 1980)
Facts
Robalewski was an inmate at correctional facility who escaped after attacking a guard. Robalewski was traced to an apartment and officers entered, intending to arrest Robalewski. Robalewski was sitting at a kitchen table and placed under arrest. Another detective examined Robalewski’s jacket on a living room couch and found a revolver.
Procedural History
The revolver was introduced as evidence at Robalewski’s trial and he was convicted on six counts.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in admitting the revolver found in Robalewski’s jacket as incident to the arrest?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that all of the trial justice’s justifications for admitting the revolver (no barrier, presence of other adults, lunge and leap, etc.) were in error and the record does not support the conclusion that the jacket lay within Robalewski’s immediate control at the time of his arrest.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the trial court.
Robalewski was an inmate at correctional facility who escaped after attacking a guard. Robalewski was traced to an apartment and officers entered, intending to arrest Robalewski. Robalewski was sitting at a kitchen table and placed under arrest. Another detective examined Robalewski’s jacket on a living room couch and found a revolver.
Procedural History
The revolver was introduced as evidence at Robalewski’s trial and he was convicted on six counts.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in admitting the revolver found in Robalewski’s jacket as incident to the arrest?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that all of the trial justice’s justifications for admitting the revolver (no barrier, presence of other adults, lunge and leap, etc.) were in error and the record does not support the conclusion that the jacket lay within Robalewski’s immediate control at the time of his arrest.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the trial court.
Stackhouse v. State, 468 A.2d 333 (1983)
Facts
Wong was robbed from his hotel room and identified Stackhouse from a photo lineup. Officers went to Stackhouse’s address and the person answering the door identified himself as Lewis, which was confirmed by his foster sister. Police later discovered the man was Stackhouse and returned the house, finding Stackhouse in the attic. A gun barrel was found near where Stackhouse was.
Procedural History
The trial court admitted the gun barrel into evidence.
Issue(s)
Did the lower court err in admitting the gun barrel into evidence?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that mere presence of third persons is not an exigency that will justify a warrantless search. The police action must be justified by an immediate and compelling need and not by an inference about a future possibility. Considering the facts surrounding the case, we hold that exigent circumstances did not justify a search of the attic and seizure of the gun barrel.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Wong was robbed from his hotel room and identified Stackhouse from a photo lineup. Officers went to Stackhouse’s address and the person answering the door identified himself as Lewis, which was confirmed by his foster sister. Police later discovered the man was Stackhouse and returned the house, finding Stackhouse in the attic. A gun barrel was found near where Stackhouse was.
Procedural History
The trial court admitted the gun barrel into evidence.
Issue(s)
Did the lower court err in admitting the gun barrel into evidence?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that mere presence of third persons is not an exigency that will justify a warrantless search. The police action must be justified by an immediate and compelling need and not by an inference about a future possibility. Considering the facts surrounding the case, we hold that exigent circumstances did not justify a search of the attic and seizure of the gun barrel.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Simpler v. State, 568 A.2d 22 (Md. Ct. App. 1990)
Facts
Officer Wassmer approached a group in the woods drinking beer. Suspecting some were underage, he requested identification and patted down each person, except the female. Wassmer found a bong on Simpler, arrested him, then discovered marijuana in Simpler’s jacket. Wassmer explained that based on prior contact with Simpler, he believed Simpler would have a weapon.
Procedural History
The trial court denied Simpler’s motion to suppress and Simpler was convicted for possession of marijuana.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress, finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that Simpler was armed and dangerous when frisked?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that when Simpler was frisked, the most serious violation was a civil offense which the maximum fine was $100. Issuance of a citation is not an arrest, and the frisk is not a search incident to an arrest. Although a reasonable stop is a necessary predecessor to a reasonable frisk, a reasonable frisk does not inevitably follow in the wake of every reasonable stop. The very minor offense here cannot, in and of itself, justify the frisk.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Officer Wassmer approached a group in the woods drinking beer. Suspecting some were underage, he requested identification and patted down each person, except the female. Wassmer found a bong on Simpler, arrested him, then discovered marijuana in Simpler’s jacket. Wassmer explained that based on prior contact with Simpler, he believed Simpler would have a weapon.
Procedural History
The trial court denied Simpler’s motion to suppress and Simpler was convicted for possession of marijuana.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress, finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that Simpler was armed and dangerous when frisked?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that when Simpler was frisked, the most serious violation was a civil offense which the maximum fine was $100. Issuance of a citation is not an arrest, and the frisk is not a search incident to an arrest. Although a reasonable stop is a necessary predecessor to a reasonable frisk, a reasonable frisk does not inevitably follow in the wake of every reasonable stop. The very minor offense here cannot, in and of itself, justify the frisk.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Facts
Officer was on routine patrol when he stopped vehicle for burned out lights. Gonzales was the driver, with five other passengers, including Bustamonte. Gonzales had no identification but Alcala did and explained it was his brother’s car. Officer asked Alcala if he could search the car and Alcala consented. Officer discovered checks stolen from a car wash.
Procedural History
Bustamonte moved to suppress the checks but the trial judge denied the motion and Bustamonte was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, utilizing a totality of the circumstances test for Alcala’s consent. Bustamonte filed a writ of habeas corpus and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the State was under an obligation to show it was understood consent could be freely withheld.
Issue(s)
Did the Ninth Circuit err in finding that in order for consent to be valid, that it was not only uncoerced but given with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that prior decisions did not turn on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the Ninth Circuit finds no support in any of our decisions that have attempted to define the meaning of voluntary.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Officer was on routine patrol when he stopped vehicle for burned out lights. Gonzales was the driver, with five other passengers, including Bustamonte. Gonzales had no identification but Alcala did and explained it was his brother’s car. Officer asked Alcala if he could search the car and Alcala consented. Officer discovered checks stolen from a car wash.
Procedural History
Bustamonte moved to suppress the checks but the trial judge denied the motion and Bustamonte was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, utilizing a totality of the circumstances test for Alcala’s consent. Bustamonte filed a writ of habeas corpus and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the State was under an obligation to show it was understood consent could be freely withheld.
Issue(s)
Did the Ninth Circuit err in finding that in order for consent to be valid, that it was not only uncoerced but given with an understanding that it could be freely and effectively withheld?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that prior decisions did not turn on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. The approach of the Ninth Circuit finds no support in any of our decisions that have attempted to define the meaning of voluntary.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
Facts
Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital after getting into a car accident. The police officer directed that a blood sample be drawn from Schmerber to test his blood alcohol level.
Procedural History
The report of the blood alcohol level analysis was admitted at trial and Schmerber was convicted driving while intoxicated.
Issue(s)
Were the police justified in requiring Schmerber to consent to a blood test and were the means used respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there was plainly probable cause to arrest Schmerber but the mere fact of a lawful arrest does not end the inquiry. First, there may be more immediate danger of concealed weapons or of destruction of evidence under the direct control of the accused and second, once a search for weapons is permitted, it would be impractical to confine the search to those items alone. Given that the officer might reasonably have believed he was confronted with an emergency, the attempt to secure blood-alcohol content was an appropriate incident to Schmerber’s arrest. Also, the means chosen were a reasonable one.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the conviction of Schmerber.
Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital after getting into a car accident. The police officer directed that a blood sample be drawn from Schmerber to test his blood alcohol level.
Procedural History
The report of the blood alcohol level analysis was admitted at trial and Schmerber was convicted driving while intoxicated.
Issue(s)
Were the police justified in requiring Schmerber to consent to a blood test and were the means used respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that there was plainly probable cause to arrest Schmerber but the mere fact of a lawful arrest does not end the inquiry. First, there may be more immediate danger of concealed weapons or of destruction of evidence under the direct control of the accused and second, once a search for weapons is permitted, it would be impractical to confine the search to those items alone. Given that the officer might reasonably have believed he was confronted with an emergency, the attempt to secure blood-alcohol content was an appropriate incident to Schmerber’s arrest. Also, the means chosen were a reasonable one.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the conviction of Schmerber.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
Facts
A taxi driver had been murdered and police were informed another driver had been held up. Police responded and found Innis, who was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. Innis was subsequently advised numerous times and invoked his right to counsel. While en route to the police station, two officers were conversing about their concern for disabled children finding the shotgun. Innis then exclaimed he would lead the police to the shotgun.
Procedural History
Innis moved to suppress the shotgun and his statements. The trial court denied the motion, finding Innis’ utterance was a waiver. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, finding that the officers had interrogated Innis after he invoked his right to counsel.
Issue(s)
Did the Rhode Island Supreme Court err in finding that Innis had been interrogated while officers in the front seat were talking about their concerns for children with disabilities discovering the shotgun?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that interrogation refers not only to express questioning but also words or actions that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The conversation in the present case was nothing more than a dialogue between the officers to which no response from Innis was invited. It cannot be said that the officers should have known their conversation was likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court and reversed.
A taxi driver had been murdered and police were informed another driver had been held up. Police responded and found Innis, who was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. Innis was subsequently advised numerous times and invoked his right to counsel. While en route to the police station, two officers were conversing about their concern for disabled children finding the shotgun. Innis then exclaimed he would lead the police to the shotgun.
Procedural History
Innis moved to suppress the shotgun and his statements. The trial court denied the motion, finding Innis’ utterance was a waiver. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed, finding that the officers had interrogated Innis after he invoked his right to counsel.
Issue(s)
Did the Rhode Island Supreme Court err in finding that Innis had been interrogated while officers in the front seat were talking about their concerns for children with disabilities discovering the shotgun?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that interrogation refers not only to express questioning but also words or actions that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The conversation in the present case was nothing more than a dialogue between the officers to which no response from Innis was invited. It cannot be said that the officers should have known their conversation was likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court and reversed.
People v. Graham, 626 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
Facts
Smith and McDonald were patrolling an area known for narcotics and witnessed Graham sitting on a park bench with a paper bag. During their observation, five people approached Graham, he took something out of the bag, and exchanged for money. Smith and McDonald approached Graham and found crack vials in the bag.
Procedural History
Graham moved to suppress the evidence and the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding that Smith and McDonald had probable cause to conduct the search based on exchanging unidentified objects for money in a drug-infested area?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that observation of a drug package is not a sine qua non for the existence of probable cause is a drug sale. Street sellers should not enjoy an immunity from arrest or search merely because they are able to conceal their wares during the exchange. If money is passed in exchange for the envelope, probable cause almost surely would exist. By placing his bag near the fence, Graham was obviously distancing himself from the contents of the bag and taking caution to conceal whatever he was selling. Considering the totality of the circumstances, any experienced police officer would reasonably have concluded that what he had observed were five drug sales.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Smith and McDonald were patrolling an area known for narcotics and witnessed Graham sitting on a park bench with a paper bag. During their observation, five people approached Graham, he took something out of the bag, and exchanged for money. Smith and McDonald approached Graham and found crack vials in the bag.
Procedural History
Graham moved to suppress the evidence and the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding that Smith and McDonald had probable cause to conduct the search based on exchanging unidentified objects for money in a drug-infested area?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that observation of a drug package is not a sine qua non for the existence of probable cause is a drug sale. Street sellers should not enjoy an immunity from arrest or search merely because they are able to conceal their wares during the exchange. If money is passed in exchange for the envelope, probable cause almost surely would exist. By placing his bag near the fence, Graham was obviously distancing himself from the contents of the bag and taking caution to conceal whatever he was selling. Considering the totality of the circumstances, any experienced police officer would reasonably have concluded that what he had observed were five drug sales.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122 (1976)
Facts
DEA agent made a controlled buy of narcotics from Gonzalez and returned to arrest him. A scuffle ensued and Gonzalez’s wife locked the door and proceeded to discard cocaine. When entering the apartment to detain both, approximately nine agents had arrived. Mrs. Gonzalez’s mother and grandfather arrived but were asked to leave. Gonzalez first consented to a search and his wife consented after Gonzalez. A commercial quantity of drugs was discovered.
Procedural History
Gonzalez moved to suppress the drugs but was denied and the Gonzalezes were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in admitting the drugs on the basis that the consents given by the Gonzalezes were voluntary?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that an important, although not dispositive, factor in determining the voluntariness of an apparent consent is whether the consenter is in custody or under arrest, and the circumstances surrounding the custody or arrest. Under the circumstances, the apparent consent was induced by overbearing official conduct and was not an exercise of free will.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division.
DEA agent made a controlled buy of narcotics from Gonzalez and returned to arrest him. A scuffle ensued and Gonzalez’s wife locked the door and proceeded to discard cocaine. When entering the apartment to detain both, approximately nine agents had arrived. Mrs. Gonzalez’s mother and grandfather arrived but were asked to leave. Gonzalez first consented to a search and his wife consented after Gonzalez. A commercial quantity of drugs was discovered.
Procedural History
Gonzalez moved to suppress the drugs but was denied and the Gonzalezes were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in admitting the drugs on the basis that the consents given by the Gonzalezes were voluntary?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that an important, although not dispositive, factor in determining the voluntariness of an apparent consent is whether the consenter is in custody or under arrest, and the circumstances surrounding the custody or arrest. Under the circumstances, the apparent consent was induced by overbearing official conduct and was not an exercise of free will.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division.
People v. Day, 560 N.E.2d 482 (1990)
Facts
Percy stopped Day for speeding and radioing the license plate, Day exited his vehicle and the passengers inside the vehicle began to “jump around.” Percy exited his vehicle to confront Day, and began his frisk. He felt a small rectangular object that he thought may have been a razor blade wrapped in something. After removing the package, he recognized the folding as a druggist fold and discovered cocaine inside.
Procedural History
The trial court denied Day’s motion to suppress and Day was convicted for possession of cocaine.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding that the removal of an unknown rectangular object, and the subsequent search of the package, was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the moving violation justified the stop and the attendant circumstances justified frisking Day. As to the package, the officer need only demonstrate a substantial possibility defendant possessed an instrumentality which could be utilized to commit bodily harm. As to the subsequent search of the contents, once the officer recognized the druggist fold, he had probable cause to search the contents.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Percy stopped Day for speeding and radioing the license plate, Day exited his vehicle and the passengers inside the vehicle began to “jump around.” Percy exited his vehicle to confront Day, and began his frisk. He felt a small rectangular object that he thought may have been a razor blade wrapped in something. After removing the package, he recognized the folding as a druggist fold and discovered cocaine inside.
Procedural History
The trial court denied Day’s motion to suppress and Day was convicted for possession of cocaine.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in finding that the removal of an unknown rectangular object, and the subsequent search of the package, was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the moving violation justified the stop and the attendant circumstances justified frisking Day. As to the package, the officer need only demonstrate a substantial possibility defendant possessed an instrumentality which could be utilized to commit bodily harm. As to the subsequent search of the contents, once the officer recognized the druggist fold, he had probable cause to search the contents.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286 (1979)
Facts
Cosme and Hennessy shared an apartment. Hennessy called the police and reported that Cosme had a gun and a large quantity of cocaine in the apartment. Police arrived and Hennessy showed them where the closet was and how to enter the apartment. Police entered, arrested Cosme, and found the gun and cocaine.
Procedural History
Cosme moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search on the ground that the police had acted without either probable cause or valid consent. The court denied the motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress when the consent was given by Hennessy and not Cosme?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the police may lawfully conduct a warrantless search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party who possesses the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises or personal property in question. An individual who possesses the requisite degree of control over specific premises is vested in his own right with the authority to permit an official inspection. We assume the Hennessy was a person with common authority over the premises searched by reason of her equal access.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Cosme and Hennessy shared an apartment. Hennessy called the police and reported that Cosme had a gun and a large quantity of cocaine in the apartment. Police arrived and Hennessy showed them where the closet was and how to enter the apartment. Police entered, arrested Cosme, and found the gun and cocaine.
Procedural History
Cosme moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search on the ground that the police had acted without either probable cause or valid consent. The court denied the motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress when the consent was given by Hennessy and not Cosme?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the police may lawfully conduct a warrantless search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party who possesses the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises or personal property in question. An individual who possesses the requisite degree of control over specific premises is vested in his own right with the authority to permit an official inspection. We assume the Hennessy was a person with common authority over the premises searched by reason of her equal access.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979)
Facts
Officer Povey’s attention was drawn to a white male in a group of African-Americans coming out of an elevator at the projects. After the group noticed the officers, they stopped, turned around, and then split up. Povey followed the white male, ordered him to stop, and pat him down, finding a pistol.
Procedural History
Bower was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Issue(s)
Did the facts known to Povey justify his conclusion that unusual activity was afoot and related to crime, thus allowing the stop of Bower?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that to legally detain an individual on suspicious circumstances, it must be shown that: (1) some activity out of the ordinary had taken place or was occurring or about to occur, (2) the activity was related to crime, and (3) the individual under suspicion was connected to the activity. The presence of a white man at night in a predominantly black residential area having an assertedly high crime rate is an inadequate basis on which to seize him under the Fourth Amendment.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Clark dissented, stating that the majority placed too much emphasis on the racial distinctions and failed to recognize the suspicious behavior conducted by the group.
Officer Povey’s attention was drawn to a white male in a group of African-Americans coming out of an elevator at the projects. After the group noticed the officers, they stopped, turned around, and then split up. Povey followed the white male, ordered him to stop, and pat him down, finding a pistol.
Procedural History
Bower was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Issue(s)
Did the facts known to Povey justify his conclusion that unusual activity was afoot and related to crime, thus allowing the stop of Bower?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that to legally detain an individual on suspicious circumstances, it must be shown that: (1) some activity out of the ordinary had taken place or was occurring or about to occur, (2) the activity was related to crime, and (3) the individual under suspicion was connected to the activity. The presence of a white man at night in a predominantly black residential area having an assertedly high crime rate is an inadequate basis on which to seize him under the Fourth Amendment.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Clark dissented, stating that the majority placed too much emphasis on the racial distinctions and failed to recognize the suspicious behavior conducted by the group.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990)
Facts
Muniz was seen in a car on the side of the road and when the officer stopped to see if he needed assistance, Muniz showed signs of inebriation. After telling him to stay and sober up, Muniz drove off. The officer then conducted sobriety tests and took him to the police station. While at the station, Muniz was asked for biographical information and “do you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?” Muniz said he did not know.
Procedural History
Muniz moved for a new trial because the court should have suppressed his statements and the booking center videotape. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding that when the physical nature of the tests yield testimonial statements, the Miranda protections are invoked.
Issue(s)
Did the Superior Court err in finding that all of Muniz’ statements should have been suppressed?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Testimonial evidence must encompass all responses that could place a suspect in a “cruel trilemma.” The question regarding the sixth birthday required a testimonial response and should have been suppressed. The biographical questions, however, were found to be routine booking questions and thus should not have been suppressed.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.
Muniz was seen in a car on the side of the road and when the officer stopped to see if he needed assistance, Muniz showed signs of inebriation. After telling him to stay and sober up, Muniz drove off. The officer then conducted sobriety tests and took him to the police station. While at the station, Muniz was asked for biographical information and “do you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?” Muniz said he did not know.
Procedural History
Muniz moved for a new trial because the court should have suppressed his statements and the booking center videotape. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding that when the physical nature of the tests yield testimonial statements, the Miranda protections are invoked.
Issue(s)
Did the Superior Court err in finding that all of Muniz’ statements should have been suppressed?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that in order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Testimonial evidence must encompass all responses that could place a suspect in a “cruel trilemma.” The question regarding the sixth birthday required a testimonial response and should have been suppressed. The biographical questions, however, were found to be routine booking questions and thus should not have been suppressed.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
Facts
Gross’ home was burglarized and witnesses saw Elstad. Officers arrived at Elstad’s parents home, led Elstad into the living room, told him they thought he was involved, and Elstad admitted his involvement. Elstad was taken to the Sheriff’s office, where he was advised of his Miranda rights for the first time.
Procedural History
Elstad moved to suppress his oral statements and signed confession, stating that the confession at the house “let the cat out of the bag” and tainted the subsequent confession as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The trial court suppressed the statement at the home but allowed the subsequent confession. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the constitutional inquiry was whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between the inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the later statement for the effect of what went before?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Oregon court assumed that failure to administer Miranda warnings breeds the same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional right, so that evidence uncovered must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Elstadd’s contention assumes the existence of a constitutional violation. In Tucker, unwarned questioning did not abridge constitutional privilege but departed from prophylactic standards and since there was no constitutional infringement, the case was not controlled by Wong Sun (fruit of the poisonous tree). A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals.
Gross’ home was burglarized and witnesses saw Elstad. Officers arrived at Elstad’s parents home, led Elstad into the living room, told him they thought he was involved, and Elstad admitted his involvement. Elstad was taken to the Sheriff’s office, where he was advised of his Miranda rights for the first time.
Procedural History
Elstad moved to suppress his oral statements and signed confession, stating that the confession at the house “let the cat out of the bag” and tainted the subsequent confession as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The trial court suppressed the statement at the home but allowed the subsequent confession. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the constitutional inquiry was whether there was a sufficient break in the stream of events between the inadmissible statement and the written confession to insulate the later statement for the effect of what went before?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the Oregon court assumed that failure to administer Miranda warnings breeds the same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional right, so that evidence uncovered must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Elstadd’s contention assumes the existence of a constitutional violation. In Tucker, unwarned questioning did not abridge constitutional privilege but departed from prophylactic standards and since there was no constitutional infringement, the case was not controlled by Wong Sun (fruit of the poisonous tree). A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)
Facts
Kentucky agents went to Oliver’s house on reports that marijuana was being raised on the farm. Agents walked past posted “No Trespassing” signs and found a field of marijuana over a mile from Oliver’s home.
Procedural History
Oliver was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance and the district Court suppressed evidence of the marijuana field discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Is evidence obtained through an unwarranted police search of a privately owned open field inadmissible in a criminal trial?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found in Hester, it was held that the special protection accorded to people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects does not extend to open fields. The rule from Hester may be understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Kentucky agents went to Oliver’s house on reports that marijuana was being raised on the farm. Agents walked past posted “No Trespassing” signs and found a field of marijuana over a mile from Oliver’s home.
Procedural History
Oliver was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance and the district Court suppressed evidence of the marijuana field discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Issue(s)
Is evidence obtained through an unwarranted police search of a privately owned open field inadmissible in a criminal trial?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found in Hester, it was held that the special protection accorded to people in their persons, houses, papers, and effects does not extend to open fields. The rule from Hester may be understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly private activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)
Facts
Butler and Lee had robbed a gas station and shot the attendant. The FBI arrested Butler, and after determining he had an 11th grade education and was literate, gave him the Bureau’s Advice of Rights form. Butler stated he understood the rights but refused to sign the waiver on the form. Butler then made inculpatory statements.
Procedural History
Butler moved to suppress his statements and the court denied the motion. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding that waiver of the right to counsel must be specifically made after the Miranda warnings are given.
Issue(s)
Did the North Carolina Supreme Court err in finding that no statement shall be admitted unless the accused explicitly waived the right to an attorney?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that an express oral or written statement is strong proof of the waiver, but is not inevitably necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Butler and Lee had robbed a gas station and shot the attendant. The FBI arrested Butler, and after determining he had an 11th grade education and was literate, gave him the Bureau’s Advice of Rights form. Butler stated he understood the rights but refused to sign the waiver on the form. Butler then made inculpatory statements.
Procedural History
Butler moved to suppress his statements and the court denied the motion. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding that waiver of the right to counsel must be specifically made after the Miranda warnings are given.
Issue(s)
Did the North Carolina Supreme Court err in finding that no statement shall be admitted unless the accused explicitly waived the right to an attorney?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that an express oral or written statement is strong proof of the waiver, but is not inevitably necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)
Facts
Officers were told by a woman that she had been raped and that her rapist had entered a supermarket. Police entered and Quarles fled. The officer followed Quarles and instructed him to get on the ground. The officer noticed Quarles had an empty holster, asked where the gun was, and Quarles responded.
Procedural History
Quarles moved to suppress his statement because his Miranda warnings had not been given to him. The trial court granted the suppression. The Court of Appeals affirmed, declining to recognize an exigency exception for protection of safety.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the suppression and refusing to find that the officer was faced with an exigency of public safety and thus not required to give Miranda warnings prior to questioning the location of the gun?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that on these facts there is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given. We do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions prompted by a concern for public safety.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Officers were told by a woman that she had been raped and that her rapist had entered a supermarket. Police entered and Quarles fled. The officer followed Quarles and instructed him to get on the ground. The officer noticed Quarles had an empty holster, asked where the gun was, and Quarles responded.
Procedural History
Quarles moved to suppress his statement because his Miranda warnings had not been given to him. The trial court granted the suppression. The Court of Appeals affirmed, declining to recognize an exigency exception for protection of safety.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the suppression and refusing to find that the officer was faced with an exigency of public safety and thus not required to give Miranda warnings prior to questioning the location of the gun?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that on these facts there is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given. We do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions prompted by a concern for public safety.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
Facts
A vehicle was stopped for speeding and the officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope he associated with marijuana. The officer directed the men to get out of the car and placed them under arrest. He patted them down, split them up, then searched the car finding Belton’s jacket, which contained cocaine.
Procedural History
Belton moved to suppress the cocaine the court denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the search of the jacket was not incident to the arrest.
Issue(s)
Did the New York Court of Appeals err in finding that the officer’s search of the pockets of the jacket was not a search incident to the arrest?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. In this case, the jacket was located within the passenger compartment of the car in which respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was within the arrestee’s immediate control.
Judgment/Outcome
The court reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.
A vehicle was stopped for speeding and the officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope he associated with marijuana. The officer directed the men to get out of the car and placed them under arrest. He patted them down, split them up, then searched the car finding Belton’s jacket, which contained cocaine.
Procedural History
Belton moved to suppress the cocaine the court denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the search of the jacket was not incident to the arrest.
Issue(s)
Did the New York Court of Appeals err in finding that the officer’s search of the pockets of the jacket was not a search incident to the arrest?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. In this case, the jacket was located within the passenger compartment of the car in which respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was within the arrestee’s immediate control.
Judgment/Outcome
The court reversed the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)
Facts
Victim was attacked and thrown to the ground in her kitchen. Her child came out and the perpetrator took the victim from the house and raped her. She gave the police a general description and was shown between 30 to 40 photographs. One photo resembled the perpetrator and after being unable to locate similar people, a showup was conducted seven months later. The victim identified Biggers.
Procedural History
The victim testified at trial and Biggers brought a habeas corpus action. The District Court held that the claims were not barred and held the station-house identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in finding that the identification and the circumstances surrounding it failed to comport with due process requirements?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the question is whether under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification are (1) opportunity of the witness to view the criminal, (2) the witness’ degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. The District Court’s conclusions on the critical facts are unsupported by the record. The victim faced Biggers directly and intimately. She was no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally humiliating of all crimes.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Victim was attacked and thrown to the ground in her kitchen. Her child came out and the perpetrator took the victim from the house and raped her. She gave the police a general description and was shown between 30 to 40 photographs. One photo resembled the perpetrator and after being unable to locate similar people, a showup was conducted seven months later. The victim identified Biggers.
Procedural History
The victim testified at trial and Biggers brought a habeas corpus action. The District Court held that the claims were not barred and held the station-house identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process.
Issue(s)
Did the District Court err in finding that the identification and the circumstances surrounding it failed to comport with due process requirements?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that the question is whether under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification are (1) opportunity of the witness to view the criminal, (2) the witness’ degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. The District Court’s conclusions on the critical facts are unsupported by the record. The victim faced Biggers directly and intimately. She was no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally humiliating of all crimes.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)
Facts
Respondent had been held at the police station and advised of his Miranda rights, but refused to execute a written waiver. Respondent’s sister was seeking an attorney for him at the time, unbeknownst to respondent. An attorney contacted the police department and was informed no further questions would be asked that night. An hour later, respondent was interrogated.
Procedural History
Respondent moved to suppress the statements and the court denied the motion, finding that respondent waived his Miranda privileges. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that respondent should have been informed his attorney called.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that by not informing respondent that his attorney called, he was deprived of information crucial to his ability to waive his rights knowingly and intelligently?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. We decline to further extend Miranda to include when police are less than forthright in their dealings with an attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of a lawyer’s unilateral efforts to contact him.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent had been held at the police station and advised of his Miranda rights, but refused to execute a written waiver. Respondent’s sister was seeking an attorney for him at the time, unbeknownst to respondent. An attorney contacted the police department and was informed no further questions would be asked that night. An hour later, respondent was interrogated.
Procedural History
Respondent moved to suppress the statements and the court denied the motion, finding that respondent waived his Miranda privileges. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that respondent should have been informed his attorney called.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that by not informing respondent that his attorney called, he was deprived of information crucial to his ability to waive his rights knowingly and intelligently?
Holding(s)
Yes.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. We decline to further extend Miranda to include when police are less than forthright in their dealings with an attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of a lawyer’s unilateral efforts to contact him.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)
Facts
Two officers were patrolling and noticed Dickerson leaving an apartment building where there had been previous reports of drug sales. When Dickerson saw the officers, he turned and walked the opposite direction into an alley. The officers ordered him to stop and while frisking him, felt, what they thought was, crack cocaine. The officer reached in Dickerson’s pocket and removed the crack cocaine.
Procedural History
The trial court denied the motion to suppress under the plain-view doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Can officers seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry?
Holding(s)
Yes, so long as the search stays within the bounds of Terry.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons. Under the record, however, it is clear that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search for weapons allowed under Terry. The officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket - a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon.
Judgment/Outcome
The court affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Two officers were patrolling and noticed Dickerson leaving an apartment building where there had been previous reports of drug sales. When Dickerson saw the officers, he turned and walked the opposite direction into an alley. The officers ordered him to stop and while frisking him, felt, what they thought was, crack cocaine. The officer reached in Dickerson’s pocket and removed the crack cocaine.
Procedural History
The trial court denied the motion to suppress under the plain-view doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Can officers seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry?
Holding(s)
Yes, so long as the search stays within the bounds of Terry.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that if a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons. Under the record, however, it is clear that the police officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search for weapons allowed under Terry. The officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket - a pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon.
Judgment/Outcome
The court affirmed the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986)
Facts
Margolin was approached by a man who told her there was a loose heifer. Margolin drove to the end of the driveway and did not return, found the next day in a creek. A description was given of the man and his vehicle, which pointed to Miller. Miller was interrogated for approximately an hour when he confessed to the crime.
Procedural History
Miller moved to suppress his confession as involuntary and the trial court denied the motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in denying Miller’s motion, finding that his confession was voluntary?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, looking at factors such as age, education, lack of advice, length of detention, nature of questioning, and use of physical punishment. When evaluating these factors, the confession given by Miller was voluntary. Although Boyce’s promises of psychiatric help and statements that Miller was not a criminal may have been a form of trickery, they are not dispositive on the totality of the circumstances analysis.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Gibbons dissented, finding that the friendliness of Boyce, in combination with the trickery, made the interrogation inherently coercive. Gibbons also felt Miller’s history of mental illness and 9th grade education were important factors that majority overlooked.
Margolin was approached by a man who told her there was a loose heifer. Margolin drove to the end of the driveway and did not return, found the next day in a creek. A description was given of the man and his vehicle, which pointed to Miller. Miller was interrogated for approximately an hour when he confessed to the crime.
Procedural History
Miller moved to suppress his confession as involuntary and the trial court denied the motion.
Issue(s)
Did the trial court err in denying Miller’s motion, finding that his confession was voluntary?
Holding(s)
No.
Reasoning/Analysis
The Court found that when evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, looking at factors such as age, education, lack of advice, length of detention, nature of questioning, and use of physical punishment. When evaluating these factors, the confession given by Miller was voluntary. Although Boyce’s promises of psychiatric help and statements that Miller was not a criminal may have been a form of trickery, they are not dispositive on the totality of the circumstances analysis.
Judgment/Outcome
The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Concurring Opinions/Dissenting Opinions/Comments
Gibbons dissented, finding that the friendliness of Boyce, in combination with the trickery, made the interrogation inherently coercive. Gibbons also felt Miller’s history of mental illness and 9th grade education were important factors that majority overlooked.
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